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This thesis examines the possibility of implementation of a Commercial Activity
(CA) program in the Republic of Korea (ROK) militar>'. For more than three decades
in the U.S., a CA program has been executed to improve Government efilciency. The
Office of Management Budget (0MB) Circular No. A-76 is the bible for that issue.
Commercial Activity is defined as certain activities which are performed by public
organizations that have enough well-developed civilian competitors. ROK Army depot
maintenance is presented as a typical example of CA applied by in-house management
and workers. The new Defense Resource Management System in the ROK niilitar>'
could provide the practical basis for CA concept implementation even though there are
some barriers to use of cost data for the cost comparison.
The authors believe that the implementation of a CA program in the ROK Army
will improve defense budget efTiciency (reduce budget requirements) and also generate
additional positive efTects such as improving combat supportabihty, increasing total
combat power, contributing to national growth, and promoting civil-militar>'
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1955, when the Republic of Korea (ROK) was in chaos following the end of
the Korean War, the U.S. set a Governmental policy which addressed competition
between Government and private enterprise.
As a democratic free enterprise economic system, the U.S. understood that the
private enterprise system is the primary source of national economic strength. In
recognition of this principle, it has been the general policy of the U.S. Government to
rely on competitive private enterprise to supply the products and services it needs. In
the U.S., the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), Congress, the Department of
Defense (DoD) and each of the mihtary departments have issued directions that
address Contracting-out. The bible for this issue is the 0MB Circular A-76,
Performance of Commercial Activities.
Within his first two months as President, President Reagan established the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), whose mission is to reduce and
prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. In 1984, the President's Council on Management
Improvement (PCM I) was established to stimulate and oversee fundamental and
lasting management improvements. [Ref 1: pp. 6-8] In 1985, PCM I pubHshed a
generic performance work statement (PWS) and quahty assurance surveillance program
to improve and simplify management of the A-76 cost comparison process. 0MB, in
cooperation with PCM I, will consider exempting certain activities from the full cost
study requirement and designate them for direct conversion to contract. These could
include such activities as motor vehicle maintenance, food service, janitorial service and
some automated data processing service centers. [Ref 1: p. 81]
On the other hand, the ROK mihtary has emphasized the leadership of
commanders and the soldiers' mental armament which comes from loyalty. Naturally,
there has been strong competition in training tests, combat readiness inspections, and
even in large scale mobile exercises which have been the most important factor of unit
evaluation. Various evaluation and inspection teams were estabhshed to meet the
requirements. Every mihtary organization has invested a great deal of their resources
and passions to this effort.
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After the Vietnam War, the Korean military felt more needs for mental
armaments. So the Troop Information and Education (TIE) service branch was
founded in ROK DoD to focus on the spiritual education in 1970s.
At the standpoint of resource management, there wasn't a useful ruler or
standard for the measure of performance in management, especially in regards to the
financial field. For example, there wasn't an efficient way to evaluate the budget
spending in terms of cost eflectiveness or cost-benefit analysis. quaUty, timing,
externalities, etc. Only through the commanding interest of leaders or soldiers'
participation, has economic unit operation been emphasized without any efficient
control mechanism.
As the development of the country has continued, the people's way of thinking
has changed. Without appropriate systematic management skill or institution, it is
impossible to command any unit elTectively. In this view point, the newly introduced
Defense Resource Management System which will be discussed in Chapter II was an
inevitable requirement.
A. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The ROK Government needs to promote efficiency and economy in operating
Governmental functions. In particular, Korean militar}' organizations have neglected
the efficiency issue. Recently some new policies were initiated toward efTiciency,
The main purpose of this thesis is to introduce the Commercial Activity (CA)
program of the U.S. and examine the possibility of success in the Korean situation.
The objectives of the implementation of a CA program in ROK DoD are the
following.
First, contribution to operating budget savings. Korean militar>' spending is
reaching 6% of GNP. Inspite of this high proportion, the goal of self defense has not
been accomplished. Through the implementation of a CA program it is believed that
ROK military can reduce the operating budget and therefore increase capital
investments.
Second, increasing combat power. A CA program could save soldiers in the non-
combat field. Under the ceiling strength constraint, ROK militarv' can increase combat
power by transferring soldiers from the non-combat units to combat units. Also
appropriate combat support by private enterprise could raise combat effectiveness.
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Third, contribution to national growth. ROK military has used military spending
only for military' objectives. However, a CA program would allow Government
(military) spending to boost commercial industry by providing a new source of funds.
Fourth, promotion of the civil-militai7 relationship. The ROK military
organization is currently isolated from the private sector, primarily because of national
security issues. But this isolation generates more bad results than good results.
Frequent interfaces through the implementation of a CA program will promote the
overall relationship between military and civilian sector.
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides a brief introduction of ROK Defense Resource Management
System. The status quo of the Korean defense industry' will also be introduced brielly.
Chapter III looks at the Commercial Activity (CA) program. This Chapter consists of
the tendency of historical change, steps to contracting-out, cost comparison process,
and the result of the CA program. Chapter IV notes some theoretical concepts related
to this thesis such as cost concepts, decision-making criteria, cost-benefit analysis,
learning curve theory*, and make-or-buy decisions.
Chapter V discusses CA program implementation. For the sake of convenience,
the ROK Army depot maintenance is selected to discuss the possibility and the impacts
of this policy implementation. The first two sections will describe the concepts, roles,
and organizational structure of ROK Army maintenance system, and identify the
problems of depot maintenance. The current ROK Army depot maintenance system is
not likely to support the integrated logistics system. The problems are four-fold: 1) the
skewed geographical location of the depots, 2) the limited capacity of depots, 3) the
characteristics of monopoly in the functional depots, and 4) the management problems
caused by the job rotation program of active miUtary managers (officers). The third
section will study the impacts of CA policy implementation, and discuss the benefits
and limitations from the implementation. Then the fourth section will explain and
illustrate the steps for the program implementation. The fifth section will discuss
suggestions about the related issues such as the draft system of military recruiting,
fringe benefits, mobilization law, and contract management. The final section will
summarize the chapter.
Chapter VI will present conclusions and recommendations based on Chapter V.
The CA program will not only promote efficiency within the depot operation, but will
13
also generate many external effects on both other ROK military organizations and
civilian society. These externalities could contribute to the goal of ROK : establishing
an advanced >velfare state.
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II. REVIEWS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) DEFENSE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. GENERAL
In order to provide funding for an increase in capital investment, in July 1983,
Republic of Korea (ROK) President Chun issued an executive order requiring the
Korean armed forces to reduce the operating expenditure in the nation's defense
budget [Ref 2: p. 3]. The objective of this order was to take initial steps toward
improving defense resource management.
While the ROK economy has made excellent progress, defense spending is
reaching 6% of GNP or approximately one third of the government budget. This
figure is considered high by free-world standards. Despite this high level of spending,
the imbalance of military power between the two Koreas remains skewed toward the
North as shown Table 1 [Ref. 3: pp. 59-63].
As a means of obtaining greater defense capabilities to balance militarv' power
between South and North, the Government of ROK has taken steps to obtain greater
efficiency in its use of defense funding. Promoting the efficiency of defense operating
expenditures will be the best way to accomplish the objective of self-defense.
Hitch & McKean explain three ways to promote economic efficiency in the
militar>' use of resources: "better understanding of the nature of the problem,
systematic quantitative analysis of military choice, and improved institutional
arrangements." [Ref 4: p. 218]
This paper focuses on the third way: institutional arrangements designed to
promote economic efficiency in the military sector. Hitch & McKean proposed several
methods of accomplishing this:
Stimulating markets within the government, for example, using stock and
industrial fund systems;
Increasing reliance on the private market economy through increased use of
contractors;
Increasing the efficiency of contractors through use of a wide range of
contracting methods;
Facilitating economic calculus within the service bv developing more
sophisticated budgeting and accounting techniques, and "by increased"^ use of
operational research groups;




COMPARISON OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN SOUTH AND
NORTH
Contents ROK North Korea Rate
* Man power
- Regular 622,000 785,000 1 : 1. 3
- Reserve Forces 5,780,000 5, 170,000 1. 2 : 1
* Equipment
- Artillery 2,800 5,300 1 : 1. 9
- Tank 1,200 3-, 200 1 : 2. 7
- Armored Vehicle 800 1,200 1 : 1.5




101 537 1 : 5.3
- Bomber/Fighter 450 740
- Transporter 61 369






$ 75. 3 B $ 14. 5 B 5. 2 : 1
$ 4. 34B $ 3. 4 B 1. 3 : 1
Since 1970 $ 28. 53B $ 31. 4 B 1 : 1. 1
B. OVERVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DEFENSE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
U.S. security assistance to the ROK has played an essential role in' strengthening
the militar>' capabilities of the ROK. In the past, Korea's main focus of defense
management was to obtain as many resources as possible. Government policy makers
didn't feel the need for advanced management systems and specialists to enhance
defense productivity.
In the 1950s and 1960s, arms transfers from the U.S. were made under the
Military Assistance Program (MAP); during the subsequent period of ROK Armed
Forces Modernization Program (1971-1975), the military' capabilities of ROK were
greatly enhanced under such U.S. Military Aids Programs as MAP and the Military
Assistance Service Fund (MASF).
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Since the mid-1970s, U.S. security assistance policy toward ROK has undergone
a tremendous change. Assumption of increased responsibility for their own defense
made ROK DoD realize the need for a better and more elTicient allocation of defense
resources. Toward this end, the U.S.'s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systpn
(PPBS) was studied and introduced. Finally, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
Execution, and Evaluation System (PPBEES) unique to ROK military needs was
developed as shown in Figure 2.1 [Ref 5: p. 86].
The concept of PPBEES is to design a bridge between the planning and
programming phases and to feed back the results of performance evaluations for use in
subsequent phases of planning, programming, and budgeting. Under PPBEES,
increments to programs were considered in the programming phase and these
increments were then translated into line item entries for the traditional budget
submission. [Ref 6: p. 91] This PPBEES system aims to develop a sound Defense
Resource Management System by adding the execution and evaluation phases to the
previous budget system.
On February 25, 1983, the Defense Budget Revolution Committee was
established in order to make an intrinsic improvement in the defense budget system.
Its main objective is to establish a rational cyclic process of planning, programming,
budgeting, execution, evaluation. [Ref 6: p. 7] The Budget Revolution Committee
selected eight major functions to implement the PPBEES system. [Ref 2: pp. 17-32]
1. Decision Making Process
a. Basic Concept
The process suggests that the national defense objectives should be
translated into budgetary* decisions. After identifying alternatives necessar\' to carr\'
out the mission, cost-effectiveness analysis for defense related programs should be
performed in order to determine the priority of alternatives within the given budget
constraints.
b. Directions toward Reform
At the beginning stage, each project requires an analysis report to justify its
budget request in detail; nonessential projects can thus be eliminated early. For the
appropriate force-mix, first, estabhsh the strategy concept to meet the enemy's threat


















See MBF Do <==== MBE
Execution Result Report
Note
MBO : Manasement by Objectives
MBE : Management by Exception
MBF : Management by Feedback.
Figure 2.1 The PPBEES System.
In the past, the Korean government had focused on the process of
obtaining a budget, therefore, the execution and evaluation phases were not considered
in detail. There was no consistency in the management cycle of planning-
programming-budgeting. Because of the abstract nature of programming criteria,
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planning was not sound. Distribution of defense resources, therefore, was inefTicient,
and the productivity of the defense budget was ver>' low. [Ref 2: p. 17]
2. Planning- Programming Process
a. Basic Concept
This proposal explains the process of budget organization. It is important
to understand the roles of both long-range and short-term planning in the overall
planning scheme. Requests for military forces to meet the strategic and force
maintainance programming must be coincident.
b. Directions toward Reform
By integrating the Strength Improvement Plan and Defense Five-Year
Program, the investment budget and operating expenditure could be allocated
properly. The adjust and control function of budget programming will be strengthened.
Evaluation of projects can be performed more easily by using uniform
documents in the planning, programming, and budgeting process as shown in Table 2.
[Ref 5: pp. 90-91]
It is then possible to manage defense projects more efTectively. Each
expenditure criteria derived from comparing the performance result of user-level units
can be used as guidance for planning and budget organization. [Ref 2: p. 19]
3. Program Management System
a. Basic Concept
Until now, weapon system procurement programs were performed by ROK
DoD according to the Strength Improvement Program. On the other hand, the
maintenance and supply support plans were performed by each service department,
therefore, there were no responsibility centers for each stage. The Korean nulitary feels
that each program must have consistency from beginning to end. For example, the
weapon system selection phase, research and development, test and evaluation,
production, quality assurance, procurement, deployment, and operation phases, all
This plan started after the 8th session of the Korea-U.S. Ministerial Security
Conference of August 1975. The principal ingredients of the plan are the increase oT
miUtar\' hardwareT the expansion of defense" faciUties and the development of the
defense industry. At the oeeining stage, the primary fiscal sources were the national
defense tax and U.S. fmancial support and other cooperation. But currently the main
source is the national defense tax.
Based on the Strength Improvement Plan this program is aimed at securing a
defense capability to repel north Korean Aggression without the aid of China'or
Russia. This program called for the attainment of this goal within 5 years, starting
from 1975. After the first 5-Year Program, however, every 5 years, new 5-Year
Programs have been extended.
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must have consistency. At the first stage, that program which has the highest priority is
selected based on its level of investment or contribution to strength improvement
(strengthening of war potential). Secondly, a project manager will be selected to
improve the efficiency of program execution and management of weapon system
organization and logistic support. The manager selected must be accountable and
must be given the necessary authority to fulfill these responsibilities.
b. Directions toward Reform
Project management requires approval of high authority at key decision
points (milestones). Life cycle cost (LCC) should be considered on an equal basis with
system performance, schedule, and logistic supportability. A clear line of authority,
responsibility, and accountability for the management of programs should be
established. Competition in contracting is also required. [Ref. 7: pp. 36-3S]
4. Decentralized Management System
a. Basic Concept
The unit commander has the responsibility for managing the unit's
resources such as manpower, funds, materials, and facilities. Complete autonomy in
spending on the part of the operational commander is emphasised. First, the
commander will be motivated to control costs by establishing his ownership and
responsibility to conduct their unit efficiently. Secondly, each soldier will be motivated
to find cheaper substitutes, because the remaining funds which result from efficient
management could be used for the soldiers' welfare, such as recreation facilities, a
library, sport equipment, etc.
By developing a proper accounting report system, it is possible to estimate
the performance of each unit and summarize aggregate totals. For example, 1/4 ton
jeep operation can be divided into 3 categories according to the following purposes :
commanding, operation, and administration. The maintenance cost per vehicle could be
compared with that of the same purpose vehicle of other troops, but it is difiicult to
say that lower cost always means better performance.
b. Directions toward Reform
By strengthening the function of resource management, each unit's
commander can assess his unit's assets and make an analysis of the results of his
resource spending, which can facilitate economic troop management. To establish the
management information system, it is necessar\' to first develop a new accounting
system that can integrate the total resources and adopt the user-centered logistic
management which is based on decentralized principles. [Ref 7: pp. 34-36]
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5. Analysis and Evaluation System
a. Basic Concept
This system was established to provide basic data needed in successive
planning, programnjing, and budget compilations. The basic data can be derived from
the result of comparative analysis between the required mission performance level and
the results of resource spending.
b. Directions toward Reform
The mission performance level and the result of resource spending could be
analyzed and evaluated by developing a new accounting system and the establishment
of a new auditing policy which is consistent with the concept of resource management.
At the stage of programming and budgeting, the previous data of expenditure analysis
could be used to make programming decisions as well as budget formation based on
performance criteria.
6. Management Information System (Computer-Based)
a. Basic Concept
In order to operate the Defense Resource Management System efficiently,
information (demand, procurement, operating-inventor\' control, performance
evaluation...) must be provided at the right time and right place. This system must be
computerized to obtain the benefits of speed and accuracy. This system also can assist
in decision making for resource allocation.
b. Directions toward Reform
DBMS (Data Base Management System) was established to assist the
process of analysis, evaluation and the accurate computation of resource demands.
Constructing computer networks among DoD, each division of the Army, Naval
theatre commands, and Air Force flying corps will facilitate this process. [Ref 8: p. 13]
Computerized inventory management of logistic materials and other major
resources can facilitate the decentralization of the resource management system, which
includes procurement, storage, and distribution procedures. Computerizing the
process of 5 year programming, budget organization, and execution, can accomplish
the objective of budget revolution in a short time.
7. Resource Management Staff Function
a. Basic Concept
Strengthening the function of the resource management staff is intended to
support the decentralized unit management system by properly giving incentives to the
units according to their performance.
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b. Directions toward Reform
Three separate functions (finance, logistics, and facility engineering) were
integrated and the overall management stall controls all resources. The overall
management stall is responsible for all resource management in the unit, and so seeks
the most economic level of unit operation, prepares the unit's budget, and handles
material accounting and fund accounting. [Ref 2: p. 31]
8. Reorganization
a. Basic Concept
The newly designed Defense Resource Management System is based on the
concept of PPBEES (planning, programming, budgeting, execution, evaluation system).
Thus, a new organizational structure is needed to support the new procedure. This will
require integration, restructuring and reinforcement of the new system to reorganize
the current structure to meet the new task.
b. Directions toward Reform
Reorganize the old structure through changes based on an integrated
logistic system. A part of the new organization must be a cost and program analysis
function which should be accomplished through a special organization manned by
professional personnel. [Ref 2: p. 32]
After introducing the Defense Resource Management System in 1983, ROK DoD
has made a concreted effort to implement the system in the ROK militar>- as follows:
Selection of the sample units according to the type of troops.
Design of the common structure documents used in the programming and
budgeting phases.
Implementation of the system in the experimental troops.
Evaluation of the performance results in the experimental troops.
Amendment and reinforcement in the intrinsic nature of Defense Resource
Management System introduced.
Inspection of the execution of the system.
Finally, from the beginning of 1986, the Defense Resource Management System
is being implemented through out the DoD. The Defense Management Accounting
System is designed to assist the newly proposed Defense Resource Management
System. The objective of this system (procedure) is to provide standardized data for
resource management to each level commander. [Refs. 9,10] Accounting information
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has two major purposes : decision making and performance evaluation. For example,
managers can easily decide the proper disposal time of an equipment by using the
accounting information. Regression analysis is one of the common techniques to
produce the accounting information.
The Defense Management Accounting System is intended to support not only
the decentralized unit resource management system, which is one of the eight major
functions of the budget revolution movement, but also the PPBEES which is the main
objective of the defense management system.
Until 1984, legal accounting procedures had been used to provide the legal result
of resource expenditures. The private sector's accounting theor>' was adjusted to meet
the characteristics of militar>' needs. The analysis of performance and resource
spending results can now be obtained through cost analysis.
To accomplish this new accounting procedure, the Budget Revolution Comiiiittee
adopted the unified accounting system based on the double entr\' bookkeeping
principle. Everything that has any economic value must be recorded and analyzed
according to the proposed accounting system. For example, suppose that there is a
useful plant on the base; the monetar\' value of the plant must also be evaluated
according to its growth, so annually, or at everv' prescribed term period, its value must
be reevaluated.
Two different kinds of accounting methods are used, according to the type of
unit. The corporate accounting system (also called special accounting) is adapted to
production, maintenance units and education units. On the other hand, general
combat units use a different accounting system from the corporate accounting system.
This is called the general accounting system and is similar to U.S. government
accounting procedures.
The general accounting system does not permit the concept of depreciation,
which is regarded as an expenditure at the time of disposal. Prepayments are also
regarded as expenditures not as assets, which make up the capital. In the general
accounting system bonus payments are recognized at the point of occurance. but in the
special accounting system, the average of payments is recorded as expenditures in each
period. Classification of expenditure as direct and indirect is needed in the special
accounting system but not in the general accounting system.
Both of these accounting systems will be used to provide the basic background to
estimate in-house cost if the Korean military- adopts the Commercial Activity program.
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From the beginning of the 1980s, the Korean niilitar>' has made a lot of efibrt for
improving efficiency in defense spending. These new proposals don't involve external
improvement, they only suggest internal change within DoD. The authors' proposal
focuses on the close relationship and direct competition with the external environment
of the militar>'. For the development of this thesis, the Korean defense industry' status
will be reviewed briefly.
C. ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
The Republic of Korea has started to build the defense industry required to
produce basic conventional weapons for Korea's Armed Forces. The Korean defense
industry is now able to produce most of the conventional weapons, armored vehicles,
missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels used by ROK DoD, although some slight
dependence on foreign sources for certain components remains.
The significant reasons for Korea's defense industry' growing so rapidly in a
short period of time include the government's initiation and implementation of the
entire defense industrialization processes in the planning, financing and manufacturing
stages, positive participation of private enterprises, and the United States' technical
assistance by means of technical data packages (TDPs), manufacturing licence
agreements, and co-productions.
Beginning in the 1980s, Korea has achieved the initial goal of domestic arms
production and has developed the production base for more advanced weapons. The
Korean defense industr>- has made a great contribution to the development of Korea's
heavy and chemical industries through the spill-over effects of technology in defense
manufacturing and quaUty control techniques.
To maintain Korea's defense industry, even at the lowest profit level, there
should be a certain level of production demand. After finishing the domestic militarv'
requirements, the best way to operate the defense industrv' economically is to export or
to fill the war reserve stock. But for Korea, exporting defense items or producing for
war reserve demand are not easy, because Korea's third country sales (3CS) for items
produced under the US technical assistance and licence agreements depend on US
restrictions and production for war reserves. It is not realistically possible because of
the limited size of the defense budget and urgency of investment on force improvement.
However, Korea tries to expand or maintain a constant level of the third countr>' sales
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to protect the defense industr>' from becoming bankrupt. On the other side, the US
tends to more tightly control and restrict Korea's export activities and to be reluctant
to transfer advanced defense technology to Korea. [Ref 1 1]
2. Capability and Problems
Since the Korean Government launched the drive to build its defense industry
in the early 1970s, the defense industry has rapidly grown and expanded as a result of
the Government's strong and effective control and industry's participation. The
United States' technical assistance under the framework of the security assistance
program has greatly contributed to improving Korea's defense technologies and the
production of conventional weapons in a short period of time.
The Korean defense industry is now able to produce most of its own
conventional weapons, armored vehicles, missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels. Korea
produces all kinds of infantry weapons and munitions. Therefore, the defense industry
now can support almost 100 percent of the domestic needs in conventional weapon
systems. Korea's armed forces have almost filled their TOE (table of equipment)
requirements for regular forces and only need the additional demand for replacement
and reserve forces. Because of no more demand in some weapon systems, some of
defense industries have even shut down production lines or are maintaining a very low
operational level \vith negative profits. The average operational rate of the overall
defense industry in 1984 was 42 percent, so the defense industry tries to expand the
export market. But its efforts for exports have not been successful and perspectives on
the future export of defense items is not bright at all because of the United States' tight
control and restrictions over Korea's 3CS activities. [Ref 11]
Korea is now faced with the problem of how to maintain the existing
conventional weapon production systems for which there is no more domestic demand
and also pursue the development of advanced weapon systems.
The United States has assisted Korea to have a self-defense capability against
North Korea's threat not only in the combat forces but also in the production of some
defensive weapon systems. Now that Korea almost satisfies it's military needs with
self-sufficiency, it faces the problem of underutilization of its defense production
capacity.
The United States tightly controls the Korea's third countr\' sales for defense
items which are produced by U.S. technical assistance or licence agreement. The
Korean government should seek other alternatives to solve the problem of
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underutilization of its defense industry capacity. This excess capacity will be one of the
important factors to consider in the implementation of the Commercial Activity
program.
D. SUMMARY
Efficiency in the defense sector is a major key to the overall government
efficiency problem. Since the 1970s, the U.S. Military Aid Program has diminished
greatly. Korea has felt that they must establish their own state of self defense. As
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Korea's defense spending exceeds one-third
of the government budget.
The Korean militar>' recognizes the need for budget revolution. The Korean
military has adopted a newly designed defense resource management system. The
objective of Defense Resource Management System is to achieve efficiency in militar;
spending by the use of a newly-designed PPBEES, new stafT structure, modern financial
accounting techniques, program management system, decentralized management
system, analysis and evaluation system, management information system, and a new
organizational approach.
In this chapter the authors have reviewed the new Defense Resource
Management System completely implemented at the beginning of fiscal year 1986. The
authors also reviewed the Korean defense industr>' status. This background will aid in
understanding the main point of this paper : the implementation of a new management
concept called contracting-out or the commercial activity (CA) program.
The next chapter will review the U.S. CA programs which started in 1953. This
will help decision makers anticipate the problems that will be encountered and point
out available solutions. This study will furnish the basis upon which to establish an
appropriate CA policy which is congruent with Korean government policy.
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III. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
This chapter will describe the policy and procedures of the Commercial Activity
Program of the U.S. Government (especially Department of Defense), the result of the
program implementation, and the obstacles to implementation.
A. BACKGROUND
In the U.S.. the Commercial Activities (CA) policy is currently being promoted
by President Reagan as an important way to reduce the deficit through increased
efficiency in defense. [Ref. 1] Following is the definition of CA formed in the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) Circular A-76 :
A commercial activity is one which is operated by a Federal executive aszencv
and which provides "a product or service which" could be obtained from a
commercial source. A commercial activitv also mav be part of an organization
or a type of work that is separable from other functions or activities and is
suitable for performance by contract. [Ref 12: p. 2]
The U.S. Government's policy of not competing with the private sector was first
established during President Eisenhower's Administration. In 1955, the Bureau of the
Budget (now 0MB) issued Bulletin 55-4 which stated that "the Federal Government
will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a product or service for its
own use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through
ordinary' business channels." Exceptions to that policy, by the head of an agency, were
permitted only where it could be clearly demonstrated that it was not in the public
interest to procure such product or service from private enterprise. Thus the initial
expression of this policy was a philosophical statement that reflected the relative roles
of Government and the private sector in a democratic society with a free enterprise
system. [Ref. 13: p. 3]
Historical revisions to the program can be summarized as followings:
• BOB Bulletin 55-4 (January 1955): Contract out unless it is not in the public
interest to procure commercial product or service from private enterprise. Major
emphasis was placed on manufacturing activities. There was no mention of
cost.
See Appendix A : Examples of Commercial Activity
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••
BOB Bulletin 57-7 (February 1957): Contract out unless it is a Governmental
function. Emphasis was placed on services rather than products.
BOB Bulletin 60-2 (September 1959): General criteria were provided for
approving CAs on the basis of national securitv. relative costs, and a clear
inleasibilfty. However, no cost criteria were narrowly defined.
BOB Circular A-76 (March 1966): Five criteria, including comparative relative
cost, were identified as the basis for exceptions from The policy. The cost
criteria required that new Governmental CAs show savings of at least W/o
over commercial performance.
• First revision (Ausust 1967): Cost comparisons should be performed before
contracting out. Incremental costing would be used in developing cost
estimates, "rather than full allocation" of overhead and indirect costs"which
contractors are required to use.
• Second revision, OVIB Circular A-76 (October 1976): It specified factors to be
used for calculating the cost of Government fringe benefits.
• Third revision (March 1979): It defined governmental functions and
transformed the policy of reliance on the least co"stly method of acqiiiring CAs.
A cost difTcrential was introduced favoring continuation of Government
performance, and full costing methodologv was implemented. It intended to
impart balance to the guidelines in response to concern expressed on behalf of
Government employees.
• Minor revisions (1980 and 1982): The cost comparison guidelines had been
reviewed. [Ref 14: pp. 78-83]
• Latest 0MB Circular A-76 (August 1983): A new threshold was established for
which formal cost comparison studies do not have to be performed. Also the
definition of inherently Governmental activities was changed. [Ref 13: p. 1].
Competition for lower cost or higher quality is the seed to improve
organizational efficiency, and the pressure of competition is prerequisite to changes in
Government CAs. In a competitive environment, commercial or government managers
alike would adopt bold and innovative ways to enhance operational efficiency and
effectiveness.
B. POLICY OF OMB CIRCULAR A-76
0MB, DoD, and each of the militar>' departments have issued directives,
instructions, and regulations that address contracting out. The "Bible" for this policy is
OMB Circular A-76. It announces a permanent policy that the government should not
compete with private industry and should rely upon private enterprise to supply the
required products and services. It establishes Federal policy regarding the performance
of these CAs and sets procedures for determining whether CAs should be performed
under contract with private sources or in-house using Government facilities and
personnel. There are three basic objectives of this policy:
• To Achieve Economy and Enhance Productivity. Competition enhances
qualitv. economv, and productivity. Whenever commercial sector performance
of a government-operated commercial activitv is permissible, in accordance with
this Circular and its Supplement (A-76), coriiparison of the cost of contracting
and the cost of in-house performance shall be performed to determine who will
perform the work.
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• Retain Government Functions In-house. Certain functions are inherently
Governmental in nature, beine so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance only bv Federal employee. Those functions are not in
competition with the conimercial sector. Therefore, these functions shall be
performed by Government employees.
• Rely on the Commercial Sector. The Federal Government shall rely on
conmierciallv available sources to provide commercial products and services. In
accordance 'with the provisions of this Circular (A-7o). the Government shall
not start or carrv on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if
the product or service can be procured more economically from a commercial
source. [Refs. 12,15: pp. 1,2]
On August 12, 19S5, DoD issued a Directive (DoDD 4100.15), "Commercial
Activities Program" and on September 9, 1985, the latest version of CA Program
Procedures (DoD Instruction 4100.33) was issued to meet the requirements of A-76.
The current policy of DoD added the following two points to the policy of A-76:
• To consider the overall mission of DoD and the defense objective of
maintaining readiness and sustainablitv and to ensure a capability to mobilize
the defense'^force and support structure'.
• To permit interim in-house operation on a temporary basis if a contractor
defaults. [Ref 15: p. 2]
C. STEPS TO CONTRACT-OUT
The following sub-sections will explain each step in the process for existing in-
house CAs, and expansion of a Government CA involving a 30 % increase of either
the total capital investment or the annual personnel and material costs. The flow chart
of the process*^ is shown in Figure 3.1 [Ref 16: p. 1-5].
Each base commander has the whole responsibility for the implementation of the
CA program. Functional stafTs write the Performance Work Statement (PWS) and
resource management staff form a specific Task Group" with related special staffs. This
task group conducts a management study and decides the most efficient way to
perform the function. The contracting office generally performs the function of
contract-administration. The CA procedure is delicate and complex. The detailed steps
will be explained.
'^The flow charts for the process of new requirements and for existing contract of
a CA are shown in Appendix E.
"The Task Group refers to Management Study Groups. It consists of
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Figure 3.1 Flow Chart for Implementation orA-76
l:xistmg Government Activities and Fxpansions.
31
1. Governmental Function
Determine whether the activity meets the A-76 definition of a Governmental
function -if so. contract performance cannot be considered reeardless of related
cost and efficiency. [Ref 12: p. 3]
Each military" base first evaluates all activities and functions to determine
which are Governmental functions and which are CAs.
2. Inventor}'
Those activities which are not a Governmental function are CAs and therefore
may be performed by Government employees or by contract. These activities must be
inventoried. There are two inventory lists: one for activities of 10 or fewer full-time
personnel equivalents and one for activities of more than 10 full-time personnel
equivalents.
Each base's inventorv* is updated at least annually to refiect changes to their
review schedule and results of reviews, cost comparisons, and direct conversions.
[Ref 12: p. 2]
3. Revie>v Schedule
The CAs on the inventory lists must be scheduled for review. The review for
each CA on the list is performed at least once every five years and determines whether
the CA will be performed by Government employees or be contracted out. Reviews of
CAs that provide inter-service support should also be scheduled by the supporting
DoD component (military base). [Ref 17: p. 3]
4. National Defense
Determine whether or not performance by Government employees is required for
national defense. [Ref 17: p. 3]
DoD has developed the following criteria for rational and consistent deterniinations of
an exemption. The exemption criteria include the following:
• The CA is essential for training or experience in required military skills,
A Governmental function is a function which is so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees' Governmental
functions normally fall into two categories: '1) the act of governing such as criminal
investigations or combat support role, 2) monetary transactions and" entitlements such
as tax collection.
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• The CA is needed to provide appropriate work assignments for a rotation base
for overseas or sea-to-shore assignments, or
• The CA is necessar>' to provide career progression in military' skills. [Ref 17: p.
•'J
5. Patient Care
Determine if Government performance is required in the best interests of patient
care. [Refs. 12,17: pp. 5, 5]
If the agency medical director determines that it is, contracting cannot be considered.
6. Satisfactor}' Commercial Source Available.
Determine if there is a satisfactory* commercial source available for the product
or service. [Refs. 12,17: pp. 4, 4]
If the Government has been able to perpetuate a monopoly (such as production of
helium), contract performance cannot be considered.
7. Unacceptable Delay or Disruption
Determine if commercial performance would result in unacceptable delav in
delivery of the product or service. The delav or disruption must be specific a's to
cost, time, and performance measures. [Refs. 12,17: pp. 4, 5]
If the delay is significant, contract performance cannot be considered.
8. Process for Cost Comparison
Determine if commercial performance would result in sufficient cost savings to
justify conversion to contract performance. [Ref 16]
This requires:
• Preparation of a performance work statement (PWS) for the activity, and a
management studv to determine the most efficient method of Government
performance [Ref '17: pp. 9-10].
Development of an estimate of the cost of the most efficient Government
performance, and solicitation of competitive bids or proposal for contract
performance. [Ref 17: pp. 11-12].
•
Comparison of the cost of Government most efficient performance with the
cost of contract performance, includiiie the cost of contract administration and
all conversion costs. [Ref 16: p. IV-3S].
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9. Contract Award Decision
Award a contract if the total cost of contract performance is less than
Government costs bv at least 10 percent of the Government personnel cost.
Otherwise cancel the solicitation ana continue the Government activity. [Ref 16]
Under some circumstances the contracts can be awarded without the cost comparison
because the other tests cannot be met. An agency may convert an activity to contract
without a cost study if:
• the activity involves fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees [Ref 17: pp.
• the contract will be awarded under a preferential procurement prosram (such as
small business. Federal Prison Industries, handicapped wor"Rshops, etc.)
[Ref 17: p. 4], or
• the agency has a documented basis for assuming that contract performance will
be less co'stlv; such as experience that the cost oi' contract custodian services is
consistently lower, bv 50 percent, than in-house performance [Ref 16: p. 1-5].
D. COST COMPARISON PROCESS
The completed cost study will provide reasonable estimates of the cost of
alternative courses of action. To assure a fair and equitable comparison, in-house cost
estimates must be based on the same scope of work provided in the performance work
statement and include estimates of all significant and measurable costs.
1. Performance Work Statement
Preparation of the Performance Work Statement (PWS) is critical since it is
the basis for the cost comparison. It must be sufficiently comprehensive to ensure that
in-house or contract performance will satisfy Government requirements. The PWS
should clearly state what is to be done without describing how it is to be done.
The PWS should describe the output requirements of the in-house operation,
including all responsibilities and the requirements for facilities, equipment and material.
It should also provide performance standards and a quality assurance plan to ensure a
comparable level of performance for either an in-house or contract operation. It serves
as the basis for determining both contract and Government cost to ensure
comparability and equity in the cost analysis. [Ref 13: p. 109]
2. Management Study
Soon after the PWS is initially developed, the Task Group must complete a
management study to determine the most efficient and eflective organization for
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Government performance of the PWS. The current work-force, materials, equipment
and facilities, and procedures will be analyzed and adjusted to appropriate levels.
To be efficient, the activity work-load must be accomplished with as few
resources as possible. To be effective, an organization must be able to successfully
accomplish the mission at the required standard of performance.
The PWS and the results of the management study are then used to prepare
the in-house estimate. The CA management study is mandator^'. It seeks to identify
essential functions to be performed, determine performance factors and determine
organization structure, staffmg, and operating procedures for the most efficient and
effective in-house performance of the commercial activity. The new Government
organization becomes the basis of the Government estimate for the cost comparison
with potential contractors. In this context, efficient (or cost elTective) means that the
required level of work-load (output, as described in the performance work statement) is
accomplished with as little resource consumption (input) as possible without
degradation in the required quality level of products or services. Resources consumed
may include personnel, time, dollars, supplies, equipment and energy. Dollar costs are
the useful means of combining these resources for comparison as discussed below.
Effectiveness compares what an activity or group of people actually accomplishes in
relation to an assigned mission. [Ref 12: p. III-l]
3. Cost Estimations
a. In-house Cost Estimation
The in-house estimate must be based on the same PWS used in the
contract solicitation. In addition, it must be developed on the premise that costs which
would continue at the same level regardless of the method of performance (in-house or
contract) will not be included. When the PWS and resulting in-house cost estimate for
an existing Government activity are based on any variation from current operations,
e.g., scope of work, stafiing, materials or equipment, such variations must be consistent
with agency manpower and personnel regulations and must be coordinated with the
agency's budget office. The organization which would provide most efficient
performance may not be allowed by regulation. If so, the cost should be based only the
allowable organization. There are sometimes political problems with the most efficient
solution. [Ref 12: p. IV-2]
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b. Contract Cost
When the PWS has been completed, firm bids or proposals will be solicited
in accordance with the acquisition strategy. Use of sealed bids with firm fixed-price
bids is preferred. However, proposals should be requested for competitive negotiations
when this method would be more suitable and is warranted under current procurement
regulations with fixed price incentive contracts preferred. It is essential that the
invitation for bids or request for proposals provide for a comnion standard of
performance that permits an equitable comparison of Government and contract costs
for performing the same work. At this stage, the contract price is still unknown.
[Ref. 12: p. IV-3]
E. RESULT OF CA COMPETITION
1. Cost Savings
The DoD reviewed for the Congress all contracts it awarded under the
provisions of A-76 between October 1, 19S0, and October 1, 1982. The Government
retained 45 percent of CAs reviewed because of lower costs. On average, contractors
underbid in-house costs by 24 percent as shown in Table 3. [Ref 18]
Additionally, the in-house work force on average had already reduced their costs by
about 7 percent. Thus, the overall savings resulting from the coiripetitive process were
in excess of 30 percent.
However, the actual contract cost increased slightly when the Government
revised the original estimate because of the changes in the scope of work not reflected
in the original estimate and actual wage rate increases. As a result of both cost
increases, the actual cost savings decreased slightly to about S 250 million (22%). Thus,
total savings were about 29%.
In 1983, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installation, and
Logistics) tasked the Logistics Management Institute to find out how winning activities
had achieved these cost reductions [Ref 19: P. 3J. The cost reduction measures among
their detailed findings, which Korean industry and in-house management can apply, are
discussed in the following subsections.
a. Organizational Changes
Competition forces managers to identify areas in which organizational
changes enable them to reduce the number of employees, especially costly supervisors,
while at the same time the new structure emphasizes effective personnel placement and
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TABLE 3
CONVERSIONS TO CONTR^^CT COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL COST
ESTIMATES WITH REVISED IN-HOUSE AND ACTUAL COSTS
* Original Cost Estimates $ in thousands
- In-house Performance Costs 1,039,033
- Contract Performance Cost 789,838
- Cost Advantage 249,195
- Percent of Cost Advantage
to In-house Cost 24 % (31 %)
* Revised In-house Cost Estimates
and Actual Contract Costs to
the Government
- In-house Revised Estimates 1,128,100
- Actual Contract Costs 878,590
- Cost Advantage 249,510
- Percent of Cost Advantage
to In-house Cost 22 % (29 %)
^ Note :
This revised estimate reflects changes in the scope of work not reflected in the
original estimate and wage rate increases that would have occured had the
work been accomphshed.
optimum use of facilities. As an example, having combined supply, transportation, and
procurement functions, contractors are benefiting from a small but stronger cadre of
supervisors and a plant layout that enhances material receipt and storage. [Ref. 19]
b. Work Locations
Maintenance activities at large installations typically consist of one main
shop and one or more satellite shops. Each of the latter operates within a specific
geographic area and requires a separate supervisor to control and schedule its work
force. Many successful competitors, however, have consolidated satellite shops into a
37
central facility, a step that has led to savings in areas such as staffing, supervision, and
capital equipment outlays. Satellite shops tend to staff their operations year-round at
levels adequate to meet peak work requirements. Centralization alleviates such
imbalances between work load and manpower and enables activities to operate with
fewer authorized spaces and no reduction in the range of available skills. The satellite
shop foreman, freed of supervisorv' responsibilities, can return to worker status.
Usually the level of service remains high. Although generally an effective means for
reducing operating costs, consolidation is advisable only when service to the customer
will not suffer. In the niihtary, we must also consider the increased vulnerabihty of a
centralized facility. [Ref 19]
c. Efficient Use of Supervisors and Workers
Working supervisors, those who supervise as well as perform hands-on
work, were prevalent among the winning commercial organizations. In-house activities
generally took a somewhat different approach . Instead of reclassifying supervisor}'
positions many successful in-house competitors eliminated those positions and
redistributed work within the organization. They assigned responsibility for personnel
management functions, including employee selection, evaluation, and counseling, to
higher management levels and put working-level supervisors in charge of such things as
quahty control and work scheduling. Line supervisors now have greater span of
control over the work force and play a larger role in assuring the quality of its product.
Some supervisors informed workers that they were expected to complete
tasks within the specified time, and management implemented a cost accounting system
that kept track of the time a worker charged to each assignment. Both commercial and
in-house winners relied on multi-skilled workers to accommodate periodic changes in
work load. These workers thus broadened their skill base and are better quaUfied to
compete for other positions in the organization. [Ref 19]
J. Reduced Pay Levels
Many winners reduced operating costs by lowering the average pay grades
of workers. In most instances, they took such action after in-house management
analysts determined that some positions were staffed by higher grades than necessary.
[Ref 19: p. 5] Historically, management has structured and graded the base operations
support work force to ensure that only the most qualified workers were available for a
job. The newer practice of assigning tasks to qualified but lower-graded workers
maybe more consistent with the spirit and principles of A-76 contracting.
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e. Capital Equipment
Recognizing that labor costs account for the largest portion of their
operating budgets, winning organizations strive to get the most out of ever>' worker
and are therefore acquiring productivity-enhancing assets. Managers at the winning
activities are also more knowledgeable about state-of-the-art equipment and its
potential for cost reduction. Not all in-house managers are avaiUng themselves of
DoD's fast-payback opportunities for productivity-enhancing capital investments.
[Ref 19]
/. l\'onadoptable Measures
While in-house activities could implement many of the contractor-specific
measures just mentioned, they cannot adapt two others:lower wages, rapid hiring and
firing. While in-house activities must comply with a number of personnel management
rules governing hiring and firing, contractors do not and therefore can easily adjust
personnel levels to accommodate work-load fluctuations. They also can deal more
quickly with problem employees. Contractors are able to quickly release poor
performers thereby minimizing deadwood on the payroll and motivating the remaining
workers, who witness first-hand the consequences of substandard performance.
Moreover, because commercial firms enjoy greater flexibility in personnel management,
they can take more risks when formulating bids. In-house activities, on the other
hand, find it difficult to release a poor performer. Removal requires an inordinate
amount of the supervisor's time and frequently results in a series of appeals that can
last for months. In addition, despite having fewer positions than they did prior to A-76
competition, in-house management is not able to fill vacancies any faster than before.
[Ref 19: p. 9]
Government activities usually have to use a cumbersome supply system
that emphasizes competitive prices, often at the expense of response time. Contractors
are willing to pay a slightly higher premium if doing so will result in quick response
and timely deliverv'. A common complaint of in-house winners is that, in the area of
vehicle maintenance, they are at the mercy of other organizational elements. They
contend that vehicle-support elements schedule routine maintenance with little regard
for the using activity's work-load. Contractors, however, take extraordinary care to
keep workers equipped, even if it means doing routine vehicle maintenance at night or
loading vehicles while others are being serviced. [Ref 19: pp. 6-7]
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A-76 winners have eliminated or modified tasks deemed marginally
necessar\', but this has not been an easy change. Some CA support personnel have
willingly provided service above and beyond standards, and customers have come to
expect it. Now, in-house winners must operate much like contractors, working within
limited budgets and following a carefully-defmed, detailed set of guidelines. Extra
services once performed routinely now get done only if they are part of standard
operating procedures. This results in less flexibility within the winning organization.
Contractors frequently and enthusiastically use overtime, and employ part-
time workers, usually off-duty militar\' personnel and their dependents. In-house
management, on the other hand, seems to labor under the false impression that, except
for students, government personnel ofTices cannot hire part-timers. Additionally, unlike
in-house management, contractors are able to establish permanent relationships with
specific suppliers for common parts and equipment.
2. Obstacles to Implementation
Most of the cost comparisons which were conducted demonstrated the
economy of competitive procurement and resulted in the conversion of Government
activity to the private sector. However, several serious obstacles to implementation
soon became obvious despite a sincere effort from the Reagan Administration to
achieve the cost savings inherent in the procedures.
a. In-house Perspectives
The CA program is highly sensitive because it means there is a chance that
existing Government employees will be replaced by commercial contractor personnel.
[Ref 18] Thus, agencies should be provided proper incentives to develop the most
efficient organizations for the purpose of the cost study. In addition, employees should
be able to appeal erroneous determinations. Incentives must be provided to insure an
accurate PWS. There also should be routine reviews of the net effect of contracting
out at the agency.
Forcing the in-house cost estimate to include the cost of retirement over a
thirty year period for the unfunded liability in the Civil Retirement System while no
similar calculation is included for the contractor on the unfunded liability in the Social
Security System is inequitable. In addition, there is substantial overcharging for the
cost of performing the function in-house for the expenditure for materials and supplies.
^This is a special problem, but ROK miUtar>' code prohibits the military
personnel from having secondary' jobs.
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Costs attributable to the contractor for the cost of contract administration have also
undercharged the contractor. The contractors are also inadequately charged for
conversion costs in implementing the turnover to contractor performance. [Ref 13: p.
99]
No cost study is required where there are ten or less full-time equivalent
employee positions. The program also requires that where the in-house estimate is
flawed and cannot be corrected before the bid submission date, the contract will be
given to the contractor without consideration of the in-house bid. The in-house cost
estimates should be based on the most efficient and cost effective organization and
staffing possible. Incomplete PWSs have led to significantly over-estimated cost savings
from contracting out, and 50 percent of the cost comparison studies which included
contract administration cost estimates were too low. [Ref 13: p. 101]
Also when the contractor wins the contract, there is an evidence of
opportunism. Because of the quasi rent behavior, the contract price may go up. To
prevent the quasi rent behavior, contract type or method should be considered
carefully.
b. Perspectives of the Private Sector
Industry does not fear competition. Competition is a way of life in the
private sector, and any company that cannot compete goes out of business. First, it is
strongly maintained that 75-80% of the CAs have to be continued in-house for national
security reasons. The decentralization of authority in the U.S. governmental structure
makes it exceedingly difficult for any central management agency to control activities
in a department or independent agency. The second problem is a result of political
pressure. Fortunately, industry is now better organized to deal with such political
pressure than in the past. The third major problem is inequitable pressure in cost
comparison.
Execution of the contract itself must result in savings of at least 10 percent
of the Government's personnel-related costs in performing the activity in-house. In
defense contracting costs, all overhead and indirect costs up to the top corporate level
must be allocated equally to all Government contracts. By contrast. Government cost^
estimates have never included allocation of all overhead and indirect costs. On the
other hand in-house activities will recognize an incremental decrease in overhead and
o
""Government overhead costs are usually fixed costs. If the overhead costs are
allocated to in-house cost estimation, small portion of those costs can be allocated.
However, it could be ignored as a sunk cost.
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indirect costs that might occur if the particular function under study is converted to
contract performance. This amount is far from full allocation of Government overhead
and indirect costs. [Ref 13: pp. 8-9]
Under a firm fixed price contract, a contractor is required to perform the
work in the work, statement with no further payment than the ceiling amount. If it
costs him more to perform than he anticipated, he loses money. On the other hand,
when a Government agency develops an estimate of their costs to perform a function,
if the actual costs exceed the estimate, so what? The agency has to have those
functions performed, so the money is provided. The personnel and resources are
applied and the work gets done. If the contractors fails to meet these work standards
he may sufler substantial financial penalties, however, there is no penalty to the
Government. [Ref 20: p. 40]
It is also common practice under a contract to place responsibilities and
risks on the contractor that cannot be replicated in the Government environment. For
instance, the contractor must assume complete responsibility for all Government
equipment that is used in the performance of the contract, even when that equipment
is not under his control. In a case where a contractor is operating a motor pool, and
responsible for all of the vehicles, a Government employee may check out a vehicle and
wreck it. The contractor is required to repair the vehicle, within his firm fixed price.
The contractor must also include the full cost of social security, retirement
and unemployment in his costs: the Government (Civil Service) retirement cost factor
is grossly understated. In addition, substantial costs are added to the contract cost:
there is no cost in the Government estimate for quality control. In negotiated
procurements, selecting a high-quality proposal frequently would be higher than the
Government cost estimate. [Ref 20: pp. 40-44]
F. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
In the late of 1950s, Cyril Northcote Parkinson argued that the number of the
officials and the quality of the work are not related to each other at all. He also
anticipated that the numbers of officials will rise in total. One interesting thing, stated
in his book, is "the recent discover^' in a certain field of warfare that the number of the
enemy killed varies inversely with the number of generals" [Ref 21: p. S]. The
competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual freedom and initiative, is the
primar>' source of national economic strength. It has been and continues to be the
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general policy of the U.S. Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the
products and services the Government needs.
But this policy encounters political, social, and economical motives. The basic
concepts remains but the detailed procedures have been revised in accordance with the
development of cost accounting methods and changes of political influence.
Misconceptions concerning the program have caused confusion, however, and
have seriously impeded its implementation. The A-76 program has been the subject of
controversy since its inception three decades ago. Over the years, private businessmen
have charged that the cost comparisons are rigged to preserve functions in the
government, while Federal employee groups have seen it as a program to contract out.
[Ref. IS] The militar\' fears that the contract option will limit flexibility, reduce force
structure, and create associated risks in responding to wartime exigencies.Although
exaggerated, there is some truth in each of those views.
When properly implemented, the A-76 cost comparison process should be an
open, fair, and effective process to ensure that government operations are performed
well and for a reasonable price. U.S. DoD reported 29% actual savings from CA
program from 1979 through 19S4. This amounts to S 1,012 million. If this program
continues to gain momentum, savings up to 30*^/0 of total cost can be achieved despite
some barriers [Refs. 18,19].
In summary, the A-76 program is an institutional arrangement to promote
economic efficiency in the public sector through use of competition. The authors will
study how the Korean Government can adopt a similar program. Because many
factors (environment, politics, social structure, etc.) in Korea are very different from
the U.S., the implementation of the same pohcy will be difficult. But acknowledging
the heavy burden of the defense budget of Korea, Korea needs to improve military'





As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Commercial Activity (CA) program is
based on the cost-comparison concept. Cost-efTectiveness analysis provides the
fundamental framework for the decision making process. The purpose of this chapter
is to review decision making theory as it relates to the CA program.
Decision makers in the public sector need better ways to, one, uncover and select
goals that are in the public interest and, two, see that the alternatives selected are
implemented properly. In the miUtary sector, improving efficiency is considered as one
of the most urgent problems. Because a military organization is a typical pubUc
organization, it is very difficult to measure the benefits of a program.
In this chapter, theoretical concepts of decision-making criteria and learning
curve theory will be first studied, then cost-elfectiveness and cost-benefit analysis will
be reviewed. Finally, identification of costs and benefits related to a project will be
introduced briefly.
B. THEORY OF EFFICIENCY CRITERIA FOR PUBLIC SECTOR DECISION-
MAKING
The fundamental objective of efficiency is to optimize the total econoinic well-
being, or welfare, of members in the society. Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure
individual welfare directly. In principle, the criterion must be clearly identified and the
optimal alternative is the one which yields the greatest excess of positive values
(objectives) over negative values (resources used, or costs). This clear-cut ideal
solution is seldom a practical possibility in military problems. Traditionally, non-profit
organizations like the military', have available three decision-making criteria for
decisions : unanimity, majority voting rule, and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
1. Unanhiiity
Unanimity can be explained by the concept of Pareto Optimality. The Pareto
Optimahty concept that was formulated by Vilfredo Pareto is the best known social
welfare criterion. Pareto argued that any change in the economy is desirable if at least
one person (in his own judgement) is better off because of the change and no one else
is made worse off by it.
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The Pareto Optimality concept is easily extended to any number of goods and
persons (population). While this principle may at first seem relatively
noncontroversial, if it ever were adopted as the standard for accepting or rejecting
public programs, it would severely limit the scope of government action. Most
activities undertaken by government reward and penalize various sectors of the
population differently. More importantly, the Pareto Optimality criterion would
prohibit any project that merely inconvenienced one person regardless of how much it
enhanced the welfare of others. [Ref 22: p. 10]
In summarv', the three conditions that correspond to the efficiency problem
are related as follows:
• Efficiencv in production (choice of factor inputs) : in anv two production
processes having two production factors in common, the 'marsinal rates of
return of each of the factors must be the same.
• Choice of output : the marginal rate of transformation between anv two
products must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution.
• Efficiencv in exchange (distribution of the output) : final output must be
distributed so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two products
is the same for all consumefs of both products. [Ref 4: p. 133]
But it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of these conditions,
since they involve the basic conceptual framework for all eflort to promote efiicient use
of resources in a general, economy-wide sense. The point here is that competitive
market prices do indeed reflect the opportunity costs and the marginal values of
individual factors and products.
Most people who understand the concepts of the CA program support the
existence of the program, but not the effected Government managers and workers who
lost or might lose their jobs. Even though this program provides a 29% cost savings,
this criterion, however, does not meet the requirements of Pareto OptimaUty.
2. Majority Voting Rule
Sassone and Schaffer define the majority rule as follows:
Economic state 1 is to be judged socially superior to economic state 2 if the
majority of the members of society prefer I over 2 [Ref 23: p. 9].
The democratic flavor of this criterion suggests that it might be widely
acceptable. In fact, it is not often employed. Although we may vote for the
representatives in government, we do not usually vote directly on policy issues; the
representatives generally make the policy decisions. Realistically, however, one cannot
expect voters to be knowledgeable of the hundreds of matters which arise every year.
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The procedures of the CA program have been studied and developed through
the Congressional hearings and political coalitions. However, conflict between the
public and private sectors has continued. Thus a policy decision based directly on
voting may not be a well-informed decision and is not always practical.
3. Kaldor-Hicks Criterion
This criterion is sometimes referred to as potential Pareto superiority. Because
of the limitation of the Pareto optimality principle, numerous efforts have been made
to develop more comprehensive criteria for evaluating programs. The most popular
proposal was advanced by Nicholas Kaldor and J. R. Hicks. They argued that a
change in the state of an economy was desirable if those who gained by the change
would, in principle, compensate those who lost, such that no one was made worse off
than before. [Ref 23: p. 9] Sassone and Schafler also defined this criteria:
Economic state 1 is to be iudged sociallv superior to economic state 2 if those
who gain by the choice of 1 over 2 could compensate those who lost so that, if
compensation were paid, the final result would be that no one would be worse ofl'
than he would be in state 2 [Ref 23: p. 9].
The concept of this criterion can be illustrated as shown in Table 4. [Ref 22: p. 11]
TABLE 4
THE KALDOR-HICKS PRINCIPLE
Program Program Gross Potential Net
1 2 Gain Compensation Gain
Person A +15 +15 + 6
Person B -3 - 5 - 8 + 9 + 1
In this case, the state implements programs which increase the welfare of
individual A by 15 points, but result in a loss to individual B of 8 points. However, the
addition of potential compensation indicates that both individuals will be better ofT.
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C. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The CA program policy is based on cost comparation. The poHcy can be
regarded as a typical case of the make-or-buy decision. In this kind of policy, cost-
benefit analysis could be the fundamental criterion in selecting the best alternative.
The remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted to identifying and discussing the
useful cost concepts and decision making criteria based on Net Present Value (NPV).
Among noneconomists, cost-benefit analysis and cost effectiveness analysis are
often erroneously considered to be techniques for appraising public projects. If cost-
benefit analysis is to be considered a technique, it is at best a loosely defined one. A
cost elTectiveness analysis is considered to be a special form or subset of cost-benefit
analysis distinguished by the extreme difficulty with which project benefits can be
identified in terms of dollars. [Ref 23: p. 2]
I. Cost Concepts
Cost concepts and terms have developed according to the specific needs of
accountants, economists, and engineers. In the financial sector, the sacrifice at the date
of acquisition is represented by a current or future diminution in cash or other assets.
while economists add opportunity cost to this concept. Commonly, the term cost is
synonymous with expense. In other words, cost is a sacrifice of resources. The term
cost is modified by such descriptions as direct, indirect, fixed, variable, out-of-pocket,
incremental, full, etc.
Measuring cost is sometimes more difficult than one might imagine. Several
cost concepts must be recognized in the procedures of a CA program because the
objective of the A-76 cost comparison process is to obtain the lowest cost operation
that can meet the quality standards the Government defines as being necessary- to
adequately accompUsh -the job. First, differential costing methods were adopted in
1967 as the principle of cost estimation for the CA program, followed by full costing
methods in 1979.
a. Out-of-Pocket Costs
The term out-of-pocket costs refers to costs which involve cash outlays,
either immediately or in the future. These costs are also often identified as variable or
direct costs. This cost concept is ver\' important in management's decision whether or
not a particular venture will at least return the cash expenditures caused by the
contemplated business undertaking. [Ref 24: p. 690] These costs consider only first




Differential costs refer to both cost decrease (decremental costs) and cost
increase (incremental costs). This cost concept means the dillerence in the cost of
alternative choices. Incremental costs should refer to the added costs incurred when a
project or an understanding is extended beyond its originally-intended goal.
DifTerential cost studies deal with the determination of incremental revenue, and costs,
with regard to alternative courses of action. In these studies, variable costs are
significant because they usually represent the difTerential costs. If fixed costs must be
increased through a change m the situation, then these costs should also be considered
differential costs. [Ref 24: pp. 669-671]
c. Full Costs
In the manufacturing field, full costs represent the sum of the fixed and
variable costs of manufacturing a unit of the product. Under these procedures, (called
absorption costing, conventional costing, or full costing) both fixed and variable
expenses are included in overhead rates. Thus, under this cost concept, depreciation on
existing facilities and equipment, upper level management costs, and the costs of
support services should also be regarded as a subset of full costs. [Ref 25: p. 69]
d. Socio-Economic Costs
Socio-economic costs refer to all costs directly or indirectly attributable to a
product or service. Additionally, these costs include some non-quantifiables such as
employee morale and efficiency, unemployment costs, state and local taxes, and other
community and installation benefits. Most of these costs are difTicult to accurately
measure and record in dollars, thus socio-economic cost might be subject to random
interpretation. Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship among these several cost concepts.
[Ref 25: p. 69]
2. Learning Curve
A learning curve, in its basic form, is simplv a line displaving the relationship
between unit production time and the number of consecutive' units of production.
Learning curves mav be views as internalJorecasis of production output and. as
such, are particulaflv useful in developing bids for new products. Learning
curves can be applied to individual learning or organizational learning.
[Ref 26: p. 348]
The learning curve concept was first formulated into theor>' by T. P. Wright in
the 1930's. The purpose was to find the relationship between average direct man-hour
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Figure 4.1 Costing Methodology.
costs and the cumulated number of airframes produced. Since then, the theory- has
been expanded to apply to a variety of fields, such as calculating direct labor hours or
estimating (forecasting) production costs.




Y^= Number of direct labor hours required to produce the xth unit,
K = Number of direct labor hours required to produce the first unit,
X = Sequential unit number,
n = log b / log 2,
b = Learning percentage.
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Basically, the learning efTects come from the reduction of labor (cost). In
recent years, the learning curve has become widely used for corporate strategic
planning. Learning means improvement that results from a person repeating the same
work and obtaining high skill or efficiency from his or her own experience, changes in
administration, equipment, and production design. Learning curve theor\' is based
upon three assumptions:
• The amount of time required to complete a given task or unit of a product will
be less each time the task is undertaken.
• The unit time will decrease at a decreasing rate.
• The reduction in time will allow a specific and predictable pattern, such as an
exponential function. [Ref 27: p. 100]
The learning curve is a useful tool to forecast the costs that will be incurred during
production; this promotes realistic bids for contracts.
Usually, learning curve theory is used to measure the production costs of new
weapons. The learning effects mainly come from repetitive increase in skill and
experience. In this view point, the learning curve theorv' is closely related to the CA
program because contractors can use more skilled and experienced manpower than in-
house managers, especially under the draft system of the Korean militar}' organization.
The length of service of the Korean drafted soldiers varies from two to three years. In
highly technical tasks such as depot level maintenance, the soldiers who do not have
any maintenance background would have to learn the required skill for more than two
years to accomplish the jobs independently, thus it will be difficult to expect them to
do highly qualified jobs.
3. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Sometimes it is not possible to put a dollar figure on the benefits to be
obtained from a particular government program. When this situation occurs, agencies
use a truncated version of Benefit-Cost (BC) analysis known as cost-efiectiveness
analysis.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is, in principle, applicable to any policy question
that involves the use of scarce resources. Traditionally, cost-effectiveness studies are
used in two different types of situations: (1) to maximize output for a given amount of
money, or (2) to minimize costs for a given set of objectives. [Ref 22: pp. 16-17] In
the military' sector, procurement or capital investment decisions have been the most
common subject of cost effectiveness studies. The method is adaptable to the
evaluation of other issues such as strategic policy, tactical doctrine, and the allocation
of research and development funds. [Ref 4: pp. 163-165]
50
Particularly in the CA program, it usually is not feasible to measure the
output or efTectiveness of given policy actions in monetarv' terms. In evaluating a
maintenance program, for example, various dimensions of non-quantifiable
performance characteristics may be specified, such as service timing, expansion of the
industrial base, and quality of the services. Cost effectiveness analysis has been most
useful in such cases.
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost benefit analysis identifies and evaluates the net dollar benefits associated
with alternatives for achieving defined public goals. The techniques used in identifying
and comparing costs and benefits are almost as numerous as existing analyses.
Nevertheless, some principles and guidelines can be stated. [Ref 23: p. 12]
Theoretically cost-benefit analysis uses a decision factor identified as the Potential
Pareto Superiority criterion. This concept labels a project as superior if those who gain
from the project could compensate those who lose so that none would be worse olf by
the project. This means that cost-benefit analysis encourage the identification of net
benefits from alternatives to aid in the selection process.
In performing cost-benefit analysis, an appropriate decision criterion is
required. Many criteria have been suggested as appropriate for evaluating alternative
investment projects according to the situation. Among these many criteria, the net
present value criterion is considered superior. Following are the common criteria used
in cost-benefit analysis. [Ref 23: pp. 13-24]
a. Net Present Value {NPl")
This method reduces a stream of costs and benefits to a single number in
which costs or dollar benefits (projected to occur in the future) are discounted. The
major problem associated with using the XPV method is the determination of the
proper discount rate. Of course, the higher its NPV, the better the project. [Ref 23: p.
19]
b. Benefit-Cost Ratio {B/Q
Normally, the benefit-cost ratio is defined in terms of discounted values.
Specifically, the benefit-cost ratio gives the benefits per dollar of cost. Thus, the smaller
of two projects may have a higher B/C, yet yield a smaller total net benefit. For
example, assuming a discount rate of 5%, two projects are compared in Table 5.














Bg = the first year benefits
Cg = the first year costs
Bj = the second year benefits
Cj = the second year costs
A discount rate of 5 % is assumed.
As can be seen, X is judged to be superior to Y on the B/C criterion, whereas the
situation is reversed by NPV.
c. Equity
This criterion addresses the impact of benefits and costs of a project on the
individual members of society. In the final analysis, the decision maker must
subjectively weigh the NPV of a project against any adverse equity consequences. This
will reflect the decision makers' own ethical standards, and maybe political realities as
well. This equity criterion is used for the discussion in following chapters.
[Ref 23: pp. 23-24]
5. Identification of Costs/Benefits
The most difficult part of cost-benefit analysis is identification of the costs and
benefits. In assessing the costs and benefits of a project, costs and benefits may be
classified by several methods. The schemes are useful in identifying effects. Knowledge
of the various classificatory schemes can eliminate such problems as double counting.
[Ref 23: pp. 31-32]
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a. Internal vs External Effects
In the simple case, the benefits returned by an mvestment would be the
revenues produced. We call these internal effects. In other words, internal benefits are
those increases in value produced by the program itself. External benefits are those
benefits involuntarily received by others for which they pay nothing. Those effects such
as the socio-economic efiect of CA programs are neither deliberately produced nor
deliberately consumed ; they are often called externalities.
Externalities can be classified into technological and pecuniary externalities
by their characteristics. Technological externalities involve changes in real consumption
or production opportunities for outsiders. These externalities represent increased social
welfare, such as increased industrial base and improved relationship between the
military' and civilians. Pecuniar\' externalities refer to the effects associated with
financial effects of the project on others, thus it appears as a price change of others.
For example, decreases in the price of a product itself, increases in the price of a
compliment, decreases in the price of a substitute, decreases in the price of a joint
product, or increases in the price of a resources used in production. [Ref 23]
b. Incommensurables vs Commensurables
According to Sassone and Schafier, commensurables are those of a material
or economic nature, while incommensurables are those involving values beyond the
economic. They like to refer to incommensurable as extra-market effects and use
intangible to describe quantitative terms that are noneconomic in nature. [Ref 23: pp.
35-37] In short, incommensurables are the effects which cannot readily be translated
into the common denominators that are being used, and intangibles are not
measurable. Incommensurables can be treated in cost-benefit analysis several ways:
• Ignore values of incommensurable efiects.
• List, or describe, all efiects which are not quantitatively evaluated in analysis.
• Identify efiects in terms of physical units. [Ref 4: pp. 183-184]
The second method will be used in the analysis for the implementation of CA program
to Korean militar>'.
6. Make-or-Buy Decisions
The objective of a make-or-buy decision should be to best utilize the firms'
productive and financial resources. The problem often arises in connection with
the possible uses of idle equipment, idle space, and even idle labor. The choice of
whether to manufacture an item internallv or purchase it on the outside can be
applied to a wide variety of decisions that are often major determinants of
profitablity and that can be significant to the company's financial health.
[Ref. 24: p. 674]
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Matz emphasizes several considerations faced with a make-or-buy decision. These
considerations are:
• Quantity, quality, and dependablity of supply of items.
• Cost comparison between make and buy.
• Required capital investment and the timing of cash flows.
• Firm's overall policies.
Determinations of the "cost to buy" and "cost to make" are not simple. "Cost to buy"
must include the full cost such as freight, handling, incoming inspection, and inventory-
carr>'ing cost, not only supplier invoices. "Cost to make" should also include all direct
and indirect costs of functions and facilities which are properly allocable to self-
manufacture under the full cost concept. [Ref 24: p. 675] In the short run, just
differential costs are significant, however, consideration of the full-cost consideration is
recommended for the long-term. At the decision point, decision makers usually use the
Net Present Value (NPV) concept. But the NPV indicates the formal monetar\'
summary' of only considered cost factors. Decision makers should make sure that the
make-or-buy decisions depend more upon the circumstances surrounding that situation.
D. SUMMARY
Public decision making processes use cost-benefit analysis as a basic tool. The
U.S.'s OMB circular A-76 also emphasizes the concept of cost comparison.
Nowadays, the basic concept of the Commercial Activity program tends to the socio-
economic concept. At- the beginning stage of A-76, the cost comparison used just out of
pocket cost, and then differential costing method was prefered to out of pocket cost, and
now they are trying to use the full costing method. Some professionals argue that the
most important thing which decision makers should consider is the socio-economic
effects of each decision. Currently, the basic cost concepts used in the A-76 program
have been changing toward the socio-economic costs. The U.S. Congress and DoD
have held public hearings to recognize the socio-economical impact (benefit) of the
program. The incommensurable and external impact of the CA program could be
explained as a shadow price. Also the majority voting rule applied through the political
process may determine the effects of the CA program.
Contractors could use more skilled and experienced labor than military
organizations in some functions. The enlisted soldiers, in Korea, finish their defense
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responsibility in 2 or 3 years, so the techniques of soldiers cannot be fully developed
in such a short period of service time. Possibly at the end of the service period, they
could reach the required level of skills. The learning curve theory may be used to
explain the cost reduction factors.
Generally the net present value concept is applied to the decision making process.
At this point, the issue of contracting-out or not is similar to the make-or-buy decision.
In this chapter, welfare criteria and various cost concepts were discussed, and
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis were reviewed. We also examined several
forms of decision making problems and the problem of the cost and benefits
identification associated with projects.
The next chapter will discuss the main purpose of this paper : implementation of
contracting out in the Korean Army maintenance depot.
Service time is partially determined on the basis of the militarv training hours
during school (college or universitv) time. Everv 2 credit-hours at militarv training per
semester contribute a deduction of one month from the basic 30 months (up to a




As mentioned earlier, the ROK Government has been spending around 6°'o of its
GNP for defense, and feels that there must be efficiency in military spending. However
during the 1970s, the arms race between ROK and North Korea became serious and
the question of etTiciency was put on the back-burner. Furthermore, some farsighted
military officers argued that military spending should contribute not only to military
requirements of strength improvement and modernization but also to national
development. This innovative idea has been partially realized in recent years.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the implementation effects of U.S.
Commercial Activity (CA) policy in Korea. ROK Army depot maintenance is presented
as a typical example of a CA currently done by in-house management and workers.
The Korean military has adopted a new accounting system as well as resource
management system. This new accounting system could provide the practical basis for
CA concept implementation even though there are some barriers to use of the cost
data for the cost comparison. Korean defense industry status and some theoretical
concepts were previously discussed for the purpose of providing the background of this
chapter.
The discussion will now shift to reviewing the Korean Army maintenance system
and identifying those problems of the maintenance system directly related to depot
maintenance performance. This chapter will also discuss the effects of implementation
as well as issues related to the CA program. Finally, possible alternatives to overcome
the barriers to implementation will be reviewed and hypothetical cost data from a
depot maintenance group will be studied to translate the data into in-house cost for the
comparison. Conclusions and recommendations will be made in the next chapter.
B. REVIEW OF ROKA MAINTENANCE SYSTEM.
1. Maintenance Concepts and Significance.
Maintenance is one of the several functional elements which make up the
military logistic system. As such it should work toward the goal of the logistic system.
The overall objective of maintenance is to support the combat readiness and
effectiveness of the military by sustaining weapons and equipment in a mission-ready
condition as effectively, responsibly, and economically as feasible.
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Maintenance interrelates with the other functional areas of logistics -those of
supply, transportation, services, and facilities- in the accomplishment of the logistics
mission. Maintenance is not done for the sake of maintenance, but rather for the
benefit of the overall system which support the soldiers in the field. Essentially,
maintenance is any action taken to retain material in a serviceable condition or. if it is
unserviceable, to restore it to a serviceable condition. It includes the functions of
inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, overhauling, rebuilding, modifying, renovating,
and calibrating. [Ref 28: p. 4-1] The scope of maintenance functions, therefore, ranges
from simple preventive maintenance services performed by the equipment operator to
complex operations performed in fixed shop facilities.
2. Maintenance Role in Integrated Logistics Support System
The Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) System is an iterative approach to the
management and technical activities. The main focus of ILS is to integrate ever\'
element of logistics so as to provide supportability and optimal operational cost during
the life cycle of each piece of equipment. Nowadays, the decision maker's concern for
ILS is serious and much effort is devoted to reducing spending through the ILS
approach. The ROK Vlilitarv' is also currently emphasizing the role of maintenance in
developing the ILS concept.
3. Organizational Structure of ROK Army Maintenance
The ROK Army maintenance system can also be derived from the logistics
support system. The ROK Army organizational structure for logistics support and
maintenance functions as shown in Figure 5.1 is similar to the U.S. Army structure.
[Ref 29]
Since its establishment, the ROK Army has adopted the U.S. Army's
organizations as well as weapons and equipment. Since adopting the U.S. Army system
(including Field/Technical manuals), there have been only minor changes in the ROK
Army system while the U.S. system has been changed greatly. For instance, the 7th
U.S. Division has a direct support maintenance battalion within the division and an
additional maintenance company from a higher echelon to provide general support to
the division.
Only at and above the division level does the Korean Army organize units
which only perform maintenance functions such as maintenance battalions of the
Logistic Support Command. Below the division level, maintenance functions are











































Figure 5.1 ROK Army Maintenance and Logistics Support System.
sections or platoons which are one part of division combat service support units such
as the ordinance support unit and the communication support unit.
a. Maintenance System
The ROK Army maintenance structure consists of maintenance by the
user, unit, field level, facility unit, and depot. The U.S. Army divides the maintenance
system into the 3 levels of unit, intermediate and depot. The unit level maintenance of
the U.S. Army is the sum of the user and combat unit maintenance of ROK Army,
and U.S. intermediate maintenance refers to the combination of ROK Army field level
and facility unit maintenance. Following is the description of each level of maintenance
according to current ROK Army Regulations [Ref 29]
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(1) User Maintenance. Operators of equipment or weapons and the crew
perform this user maintenance, which includes daily inspections, lubrication, fueling,
and minor parts replacement. It also includes scheduled maintenance. The main
purpose of this maintenance is to prevent critical failure during operations.
(2) Unit Maintenance. Unit maintenance sustains material readiness, and
is performed by the combat unit maintenance personnel. Every unit equipped with
heavy weapons and equipment such as artillen-' or tank units, possesses a small section
headed by a non-commissioned officer with several maintenance personnel.
The unit maintenance functions normally include inspections.
lubrication, preserving, tightening, minor adjustment, and replacement of easily
accessible parts. The unit maintenance level also includes preventive maintenance. The
basic purpose and direction of unit maintenance is to maintain equipment and weapons
in a state of readiness for the combat forces.
(3) Divisional Field Maintenance. Each divisional combat service support
unit has maintenance groups (platoon and section) and some of these are integrated
into the ordinance support unit. These organizations work mainly for maintenance
channeled between combat units and facility or depot level maintenance activities.
Normally, only minor repairs and replacements are performed.
(4) Facility Maintenance. Facility level maintenance is done by functional
maintenance companies from the maintenance battalions of the Logistics Support
Command, which supports several corps according to geographical location and the
combat service support plan. The functional maintenance companies provide general
support in assigned functional areas such as communication or engineering equipment.
These services are not just for a specific division but for the assigned corps. The facility
level maintenance companies provide technical and supply support for divisional field
maintenance. At this facility level, maintenance functions conducted by the companies
also support the supply system through repair of equipment and components.
Facility maintenance units will be able to organize teams to support
specific systems; for example, tank teams, communication and electronic teams, or
artillery teams. The facility maintenance companies also possess the mobility necessarv'
for close combat support. Normally, facility maintenance performs the functions of
diagnosis, adjustment, alignment, repair, replacement of modules and end items.
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(5) Depot Maintenance. There are several depots such as combined supply
depots, storage depots, and the three functional maintenance depots as shown in
Figure 5.2. [Ref. 30]
ROK Army Logistic Command
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Figure 5.2 Organizational Chart of ROK Army Logistics Command.
The functional depots consist of one depot that is normally responsible for fire and
maneuver equipment, while the other two deal with communication and electronics,
and chemical equipment.
The primary function of depot maintenance is supporting both the
combat forces and other depots for inventory management. For the support of the
combat forces, depot maintenance operations furnish backup to facility maintenance
units and assistance in technical training during peace time and war. Depot
maintenance operations also serve as a source of combat ready material from
equipment which has been rebuilt and modified.
Depot maintenance capabilities and capacity are based on the work-
load generated by those weapon systems and materials that are essential to the
completion of the Army's primary roles and missions. Several maintenance factories
within a maintenance depot each perform their unique job assignment. Depot
maintenance jobs consist of complicated factor\' adjustment, complex equipment repair
and modifications, and overall reconstruction. [Ref 30]
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b. Contractor Maintenance
After their establishment, Korean militan.' forces received U.S. militar\'
doctrines and technical manuals as well as equipment and weapon systems. Initially,
the technological level of military maintenance exceeded that of private industries, thus
the ROK military required U.S. maintenance support performed at U.S. militar\- bases
in Korea or other foreign bases, or direct foreign contractor maintenance. Radar and
aircraft maintenance has been traditionally accomplished by foreign manufacturing
companies. [Ref 31: Provision 6. 1-1-2]
Korea started to develop its own heav\' industry and chemical industr\'
during the early 1970s, and a complex electronics industry' since the late 1970s. The
technology of the Korean private sector has now exceeded the level of the military'
system. The result of this development of the private sector defense industry- is that
industrial technology has jumped ahead of that of the military sector except in such
areas as aircraft maintenance and new technology weapon systems imported and
deployed recently from more industrially advanced countries. At the divisional level,
contractor maintenance is currently used through the competitive process shown in
Figure 5.3 [Ref 9: p. 150].
Items (equipment) repaired by contractors are those for which the Army
maintenance system has no sufficient or appropriate maintenance capability, plus new
items guaranteed for a specific period of time by the manufacturer. Some medical
equipment and computer systems are examples of items for which the ROKA has no
capability. Other items such as new hov^tzers and radio sets are repaired through
guarantee provisions which state that the contractor (producer) must provide
maintenance support during the guarantee period. In response, the contractor
(producer) normally establishes mobile maintenance teams; otherwise the divisional
combat service support units collect and ship the failed items directly to the contractor.
Thus, the Korean contractor maintenance principle is to retain
maintenance functions in-house unless the niilitar>' has insufficient maintenance skills
or capability. Divisional and facility level maintenance can be considered as inherently
military activities because these maintenance personnel and units follow the maneuver
plan of combat troops and are capable of mobile maintenance during field training or
probable war. However some depot level maintenance activities can be classified as
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Figure 5.3 ROK Army Divisional Contractor Maintenance Information Svstcm.
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4. Problems in ROK Army Maintenance System
As stated previously, maintenance activity is one of the subsets of logistics.
The commanding officers have had more and more concern with maintenance activities
because their weapon systems are becoming increasingly complex and mechanized.
Increased complexity means that more maintenance skill is needed to meet the the
Army' requirement for combat readiness and normal operations. The maintenance
system must be well organized, well trained, and efficiently operated to fulfill its
important role in support of the overall logistics system. For reasons of national
security, the maintenance systems's deficiency will not be studied: only those problems
of maintenance activities that closely relate to this paper will be discussed briefly.
a. Combat Siipportability and Depot Location
For close combat support, maintenance organizations below the division
level must have sufficient capacity to maintain all equipment and weapon systems.
Unfortunately, Korean Army maintenance depends heavily on depot or facility level
maintenance, and only some minor repairs and replacement of parts are performed in
divisional maintenance organizations. So, to evacuate a piece of equipment or a
weapon system, the time interval for collection and waiting for shipment must be taken
into account, as this period directly aflects repair lead time.
Regarding ROK Army troop deployment, over 80% of the total units are
located in the area north of the Han-River, while the depots are located in the southest
part of the peninsula. Thus, the transportation costs become a significant factor of the
total maintenance cost. In the U.S. Army, intermediate maintenance battalions (direct
support and general support) are capable of repairing their own equipments and
weapon systems. [Ref 32] One of their important maintenance concepts is "first
replace and second repair", namely they first replace the failed item before shipping it to
a depot level organization. However the shortage of substitution equipment and long
waiting time for the depot level maintenance prevent the ROK Army from developing
this important combat supportability concept.
b. Lack of Maintenance Capacity
Below the division level, unit maintenance capability is very limited. Most
complex maintenance actions must be evacuated to a higher level, so the faciUty and
depot level maintenance work-loads are heav^. Furthermore, the ROK Army is in a
period of transition from old-fashioned equipment and weapon systems to new,
excellent ones which are procured directly from the Korean defense industries. Old
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equipment and weapon systems, after being repaired, are supposed to be delivered to
the reserve forces, so the depots have an additional heavy work-load.
The ROK Army is reducing the authorized personnel strength of each unit
to establish additional combat units while the Table of Organization and Equipment
for each unit remains constant. The establishment of new combat forces is another
factor increasing the work-loads on depot maintenance, as new maintenance facilities
(organization) have not been established to meet the maintenance needs of these
troops. After arriving in the depot facility, the failed item must wait for a long time in
the queue. Strictly speaking, this issue is related to combat supportability as discussed
previously and it is possible to solve these problems altogether.
c. Efficiency Problems of Monopoly
Military' organizations have been considered as consuming groups which
inherently do not pay attention to efficiency. Currently, however, the efficiency-seeking
tendency is great in the Korean military sector. Units compete with other same or
similar units through performance competition. But the depots do not compete with
each other because they are functionally organized and one depot's jobs are completely
different from the others. The depots are monopolistic organizations to the user units.
The authors believe that it is difficult to give motivation and incentives to depot
management and workers because of the intrinsic nature of the militarv* organization
and their own monopolistic character.
Furthermore, depot maintenance uses a lot of civilians employed by the
military. Many of them are retired non-commissioned or warrant offiicers, and they
have low incentives compared to those of private industr>' or even to the active duty
military' officers. The main reason for this low incentive is because of the nature of
government civilian employment. Since the boss is a militar>' offiicer, he meets
difficulties in punishing or firing the workers with low productivity.
il. Management Problems
The managers and directors of the depots are mainly active duty military
offiicers. The job assignment term of the managers is from one to two years. It is
diffiicult to say that most of them are familiar with the complexities of maintenance
management. In the highly technical area of complex maintenance, the advantage of
experience or technical knowledge may significantly impact the results of managers'
supervision. Thus the managers may emphasize the comparison of planned scheduled
maintenance and actual maintenance hours, or budget costs and actual costs, while the
quality of products and technical supervision are ignored.
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Some military ofTicers tend to avoid an assignment as maintenance
managers, because they believe those jobs are not career enhancing.
5. Summar}
As weapon systems became more complex, the maintenance role in logistics
has become more important than any other sector. The logistics aspect of war has been
changed into a material competition concept, which was proved in recent warfare
between Iran-Iraq and in the Falklands war. In this respect, maintenance will be more
and more important as a parameter of logistics. Korea recognizes the significance of
logistics and has developed a new management system which improves cost reductions
through life cycle costing, improved reliability and maintainabiUty, and other similar
methods.
In terms of efficiency, ROK Army depot maintenance has many problems.
Long lead times caused by geographic separation of forces in the field affects the
availabiUty of equipment and weapon systems. Internal problems such as low
incentives and low quality work of the depot maintenance activities are the major
problems. These problems are related to the effectiveness issue as well as to combat
supportability, which is the major function of combat service support facilities.
C. EXAMINING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY PROGRAM FOR DEPOT MAINTENANCE.
The initial concept of U.S. CA programs was contracting-out of CAs which were
performed in government facilities, but this concept has been updated to encourage
competition between in-house and contractor performance. The ROK Army also uses
contractor maintenance, but the concept is not coincident to the U.S. CA program.
The ROK Army uses the contractors only when the Army does not have the capability
to repair the afTected equipment in-house.
In Chapter III, we realized that the U.S military saved approximately 30% of the
given budget through the CA program. The ROK Army could also find many
commercial activities to which this program can be applied to save on expenditures.
Depot maintenance is selected by the authors of this paper because it has all the
characteristics and fundamental commercial activities conditions requisite for a
successful CA program.
1. Conditions Needed to Implement the CA Program
First, some depot maintenance functions are not inherently government
functions because they are not related to the close combat support operation. The next
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condition is that the private sector possesses sufficient capacity and capability to
perform the activities. Without the private sector there can be no competition. Korean
private industry has acquired more advanced technology than the military organization
and the number of companies which have these capabilities is sufficient to encourage
full competition. Furthermore, the defense industr>' has big problems with excess
capacity caused by the government' excess investment. The Korean government is
responsible for the problem and guidance to solve that problem. The third condition is
an appropriate accounting system to estimate governmental costs incurred by the in-
house operations.
The cost comparison process is the fundamental process in a CA program.
These cost estimation techniques must be based on a dependable cost accounting
system. ROK Army has already implemented the Defense Resource Management and
Accounting Systems to measure the performance of each unit. However, the cost
accounting system is not sufficiently well developed or advanced for use directly in cost
estimation and comparison in a CA program because the systems lack the historical or
standard cost data. The depot accounting system is not perfect for deriving the cost
data, because fringe benefits of government employees (such as transportation
discounts, access to military exchanges at tax free price, medical insurance, and free
tuition for children up to high school etc.) are not taken into account as elements of
cost. However, minor changes and amending, plus political and economical analysis
will make it possible to apply the cost estimations.
2. Impacts of CA Policy Implementation
a. Advantages
(1) Use of Idle Capacity of Defense Industry. Even though Korea has
experienced a serious problem in the idle capacity of the defense industry-, Korea needs
to maintain this industrial base for the procurement of surge defense materials. Even
though the demand for the defense material is limited in peace time, the ROK
Government needs to maintain the production capacity in readiness for the possible
outbreak of war.
On the other hand, the maintenance work-load is continuously
increasing even in peace time as discussed earlier. Also, consider the greater need for
maintenance of equipment during war. It may be impossible to support the resupply
requirements. The CA program helps not only the defense industry by using the excess
production capacity but also benefits the combat troops during both peace and war
time by expanding the maintenance capacity of combat units.
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(2) Contributions to Strength Ceiling Problem. ROK military are limited
by the strength ceiling which is issued by United Nations Command in Korea. The CA
program can reduce the number of soldiers in service functions and thereby reinforce
the combat forces. The establishment of new or modernized combat forces requires
more combat soldiers. In estabUshing these units, the number of men per squad of
infantr>' troops, or per gunnery- section in a firing batten-', was reduced to support the
new requirements. This has created a serious problem in operating a gunner}' section
with the reduced crews in peace time. Additionally the new coordination between the
active and reserve soldiers is an another difficulty to overcome during mobilization
exercise training and war.
Generally, CA programs can contribute to the solution of strength
ceiling problems by shifting more personnel into the combat forces. In the U.S., the
ratio of civiUan defense employees to soldiers is ver\' high compared to that of the
ROK. The U.S. military also has a militarv' strength ceiling, and solves the problem by
using government employees and contractors for many logistic support functions.
(3) Enhancing Combat Readiness. A sole source for maintenance is ver>'
vulnerable in war time. All facilities and mechanics could be eliminated by one air-
bombing. Since the ROK Army maintenance depot is concentrated in one place, the
vulnerablity is more serious. A CA program can reduce this vulnerabiUty by
introducing additional multi-lateral sources. Commercial enterprises could use their
own facilities in appropriate places, which can provide the dispersion effect and reduce
the supply response time because of the shorter transportation distance and other
efficiencies of free economic competition.
(4) Improving Troop Morale. Under the draft system, the ROK military
commanders have a lot of difficulty raising and maintaining troop morale. Each
commander uses their own unique leadership in addition to institutional actions to
improve the morale. Usually, soldiers lose their interests in militar>' life mainly because
they suffer from a high work-load. Not only soldiers who live in miUtary barracks but
also officers and non-commissioned officers, perform many many duties. In this
perspective, the CA programs may reduce their work-load. The soldiers could get more
spare time (to get back to an ordinary daily schedule) and could have renewed interests
in militar>' hfe.
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(5) Socio-Econoinic Effects. Korean military' organizations are normally
isolated from the private sector because of national security issues. Many militar\'
officers believe that the loyalty of the militar\' to the nation is greater than that of any
other group or organization. That is one of the big misconceptions of military" leaders.
The militar>' is considered separate from the general society. As an example of this
isolation, the Korean proverb states, "three persons are walking on the street, one is a
man, one is policeman, and the other is a soldier." In spite of using over 30^/0 of the
national budget, military' budgets do not well consider the socio-economic effects of
militar\' expenditures. Spending criteria have only been estabUshed for the militarv'
objectives. If Korean militar>' budget planners were- to consider the socio-economic
impacts of militar\' spendings, the spending could contribute much to raising the Gross
National Product and the development of industrial technology. Frequent
correspondence and contact between militar>' organizations and other facets of society
could perhaps promote the relationship.
The private companies in Korea usually like public work, because the
Government usually funds with cash. The private companies that engage in a
government contract can expect exact cash inflows. Vlany have healthy and constant
cash inflow. Even though the profit margin is lower than any other investment, the
companies prefer Government contracts. For this reason, lower bid offering is possible.
In other words there may be a trade-off between steady cash and a lower bid price.
All these advantages which could be obtained from the CA program are related
to efliciency. Transferring soldiers to combat forces raises the total combat power,
which is the primary objective of military organizations. Supposing that only active
duty personnel made up the combat forces, the strength ceiling might become adequate
or exceed the requirements for sufficient combat power against any North Korean
invasion. The basic concept of the CA program, competition, refers directly to
effiiciency and yields better quality work, technical development, and creative mental
attitudes and thinking toward the near future of our country. Also, competition
generates potential cost savings because of more competitive labor rates and lower
overhead costs. ROK Army maintenance depots currently do not have any competitors
or potential competitors within the military. Finally, the socio-economic efTects
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encourage a national level of efTiciency instead of on only one side. These advantages
could all be integrated into the main objective of the CA program: efficiency in
government expenditures.
b. Disadvantages
As a general rule, the net effect of competition will be positive, while in the
short run, there could be some disadvantages and problems that will be discussed as
follows.
(1) Contractor Control in War Time. It is clear that militar\' personnel are
much easier to control than civilian contractors. In war time the control issue is even
more significant. Strikes by workers of the private companies in peace time also may
hurt combat supportablity.
(2) Loss of Government Employee Jobs. Temporarily, some government
employees may lose their jobs, which will create social and political problems. Military
personnel may also lose assignment positions and the rotation plan of assignment will
be unbalanced.
(3) Higher Cost Recognitions in the Short Run. Contracting-out may
generate more budget cost recognition in the first or second years because contractors
need new facilities and equipment which may produce duplication. The U.S. program
of Government Furnished Property (GFP) can provide some ideas to reduce these
duplications. In the short term perspective, the CA program needs more early
spending.
(4) Military Security Problems. Contracting-out means that civilians have
more access to militar>' affairs which could be classified secret, confidential, or even top
secret. In some areas such as new bomb or aircraft maintenance, the maintenance
function may contain some security aspects, but most of the maintenance work-load
could be categorized as unclassified jobs. Indirect access opportunities will be enhanced
by the CA program ; the vulnerablity caused by increasing the number of people with
access to military affairs will be larger. Generally, the task of security forces will be
heavier and more complex; probably more security forces will be needed for
appropriate security activities.
3. Limitations and Barriers
a. Lack of Management Groups
For the performance of the Defense Resource Management System above
the division level, the ROK Army, established additional management staffs consisting
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of previously existing financing, accounting, computer, and management staffs.
[Ref. 33] The CA program of the U.S. needs highly educated specialists in the
engineering, accounting, management, and contracting fields. It is difilcult to say that
the ROK Army management staffs presently have enough capacity or sufficient
knowledge to carr>' out management studies and in-house cost estimations, because
these new staffs have just transferred from current Army branches. The management
staffs consist of officers whose staff specialty is planning management^^ (500).
b. Non-adoptable Factors in the Accounting System
In the U.S. CA program, cost comparison procedures are complicated and
difiicult to understand by non-accounting ofilcers. Even if the ROK Army started to
use a new accounting system, it is nothing but the first step of a corporate accounting
system. Accurate cost allocation and identification of cost objectives are ver>' difficult.
Especially difficult is the allocation of fringe benefits of labor costs. The major problem
is the draft system which prevents cost estimators from accurately calculating the labor
cost of the conscript soldiers.
c. Resistance of Commanders
As in the U.S. militar}-' example, it is clear that ROK Army commanders
don't like losing their power base in numbers of soldiers. In a power centered
organization, the number of soldiers contributes directly to the power of that
commander, even though he controls the contractors, because his influence over them
cannot be the same as on his soldiers. Initially, the U.S. CA program ordered its
commanders to contract-out if there were enough commercial sources and if the project
is identified as CAs. However, the U.S. faced a lot of barriers in implementing the
program, because ' militar>' commanders did not want to reduce the number of their
soldiers, which was a symbol of their power base. The concept has now been changed
to perform management studies and cost comparisons. Only when in-house costs are
lower than contractor costs estimations, could it remain in-house. This encourages
commanding officers to strive for greater in-house efficiency.
d. Mis-perceptions about Cost Concepts
ROK Army commanders usually consider only out-of-pocket costs of the
operation. The most important idea about the budget formulation process is the
advanced concept that the budget is not just a consumption o[' funds. Decision makers
^^100
: Personnel, 200 : Intelligence, 300 : Operation, 400 : Logistics, 500
Planning Management.
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must know that a budget has its own feedback efTects. Military spending is not just a
consumption function but also has a significant elTect on the national economy. If a
producer of one weapon system could get the maintenance contract, maintenance
activities could improve their own performance by knowing the weakness of the
weapon system. Similarly, through contracting-out, the entire industr\' gains by
enhanced production and maintenance activities and knowledge. This will therefore
raise the overall quality level and reduce life cycle maintenance requirements. In this
perspective. The CA program can be the pioneer of the feedback efTect in militant-
spending.
D. DIRECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
As discussed in the previous section, the CA program can provide many
anticipated efTects which ultimately could be integrated into a policy enhancing the
efficiency of the national economy. This program, as a national level of policy,
requires some sequential steps. Appropriate laws must be passed to provide the
fundamental legal authority. According to these laws, the ROK DoD could issue the
necessar}- directives, instructions, and regulations to implement the program in militarv'
organizations.
1. Tentative Execution Plan
It would be very difiicult and confusing if all military bases above the division
level were to simultaneously execute this program from the beginning. The ROK DoD
must schedule tentative phase-in plans from which the program could be expanded
gradually.
2. Setting an Example
a. Management Team Formulation
For the first stage, setting up a centralized management study system is
recommended. The ROK DoD and each service agency would establish several
management teams in its own headquarters. These teams will be assigned to higher
priority CA programs. The priority could be determined by the following
considerations: 1) the impacts to combat supportability, 2) the scale of the budget, 3)
the existence of sufficient competitors in the commercial sector and, 4) the general
possibility of budget saving.
As a task force, each management team will be assigned to a selected base
and study the assigned activities \vith the base commanders. The team members could
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be selected from qualified militan' personnel^ ^ or from civilian specialists if needed. To
provide local operational knowledge, temporary expertise could also be solicited from
personnel at the base. Their task will be to develop the performance work statement,
cost estimation, contracting afiairs, inspections and result reports. After finishing one
job assignment, the team could be transferred.
b. Cost Estimations and Comparison
ROK Army Headquarters will notify certain activities that they have been
selected for the study of cost comparisons, then give the selected organizations one or
two years to prepare for the cost estimation. Daring the given time period, the
commander or manager of the activity will continue to tr\' to enhance efficiency
because, after the given period of time, he can retain these activities as in-house
performance when in-house performance is cheaper than contractor performance.
Cost comparisons must be done with several years' costs because the
contract cost to the Government tends to be higher in the first year because of the set-
up costs and contract administration costs. The scheduled work-loads can be used to
estimate the costs of both in-house and the contractor in the maintenance depot.
Depending on the characteristics of the activity, the period of time required for cost
comparison could be changed. In the U.S., three years is considered basic and
additional years can be added for cost comparison.
(1) Cost Estimation Example in a ROK Army Maintenance Depot. Korean
depots use a job order costing system,^^ the purpose of which is to calculate the
production costs and then to use them as a product price for work to be done. The
Defense Resource Management System requires an exact price for each item used in
the military'. Minor adjustments in this job order costing system are needed to use it
for CA cost comparison. The salaries of enlisted personnel must be adjusted on the
basis of the total costs which would include costs of food, clothes, shelter, etc. For the
ofiicers, non-commissioned officers, and civilian employees fringe benefits must be
added to labor costs.
Korean militan' has invested much money for the ofiicer education program
since the late 1970s. Manv officers have master's or doctorate decrees in manv fields.
Korean militarv' is tr\'ing to utilize their knowledge effectively in appropriate positions.
^^An example of current ROK Army depot job order costing is introduced in
Appendix C.
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First, all costs incurred must be divided into fixed and variable costs,
so the cost estimation for the second and third year will be possible, and labor related
cost selection is necessary to calculate the fringe benefits. The Korean Defense
Management Accounting System is helpful for the cost estimation.
Assume that S393,758 is estimated to rebuild 133 trucks in year Y-1.'-'
This amount is obtained from the most efficient year's performance among historical
(predetermined period) maintenance unit costs. The depot cost calculation shows that
S 129,501 of the S393,758 are variable costs, while S 264,252 are fixed costs. ^"^ Labor
related costs are 35 % of the total costs to rebuild 133 trucks. Rebuild costs for a
three year period are calculated for the cost comparison. Table 6 shows the ways to
calculate the total costs of in-house performance.
For convenience, the inflation rate and the fringe benefit rate are fixed
at 5 % and 15 %, respectively. The pre-planned work-load of the tank maintenance
group are 140 trucks in year Y, and 125 and 145 trucks in the successive years. The
calculations are made under the assumption of no change in salar\' rate {constant
dollars), because the average salar\' rate is in steady state in the long run. The Korean
military' has enough history' to show a steady state in the constant dollar salar\' rate. If
the group is in the begining state, the salar>' steps will go up without any retirement of
higher salary step personnel. But in the steady state, one employee retires and another
enters into the steady state.
(2) Additions and Deductions to In-house Costs. In-house performance
costs should be adjusted to reflect the cost of capital and one-time new start cost if
they exist. The cost of capital is not an outlay cost but an imputed cost, and represents
the opportunity cost for the Government's investments tied up in capital assets. When
considering a shift from contractor to in-house performance in case of cost increase or
problems of contractor performance after awarding the contract, one-time new start
costs such as training, transportation, installation, and recruiting costs should be added
to basic in-house performance costs. ^^ The training costs in school organization should
^•^See Table 7 in Appendix C.
This distinction of variable and fixed cost can be derived from regression
analysis using monthlv data. Even though there would exist some limitation to"convert
to vearlv cost estimafion. the data is more reliable than past vearlv data because the
Korean 'military just started to use the Defense Resource Vlanaeement Svstem and the
Defense Resource Management Accounting System. This example is introduced in the
last part of Appendix C.
^^The total for the new starting costs is to be spread evenly over the next five
years in U.S. cost estimation.
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Costs 414,430 421,600 406,237 426,735
10. Inflation
(5 %) 414,430 421,600 426,549 470,475
11. In-house Cost for Cost Comparison : $ 1,254,572
10. Estimated Budget Spendings (Current Dollar) : $ 1,318,624
also be considered. For example, the initial or retraining costs of a mechanic could be
added to indirect costs, if required. Schools could provide the training cost data per
student for the estimation of the indirect costs. These items could be included as the
8th item in Table 6 as additional cost. These costs were not included in the above
example (Table 6).
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(3) Contractor Performance Costs. The contractors' bid cost should be
opened after estimation of in-house performance costs. The ROK Army could use the
U.S. cost comparison format. ^^ Contractor performance cost should also be adjusted
to reflect any income or expenditure to be experienced by the government if the service
is provided by a contractor. The cost of capital on government furnished property
(GFP) is computed and must be added to the contractor's bid costs.
c. Contract-out {if the contractor cost is lower than in-house cost)
After award to the contractor, the commercial activity's management
responsibility is transferred to the management staffs of the troops (installation). The
ROK Army management team must then go to the next installation where another CA
will be performed. If some special technical aid is needed . the base commander can ask
Army Headquarters for task force support.
3. Preparing (Secure and Train) the Needed Personnel
As the CA plan is implemented, ROK Army Headquarters must secure the
needed personnel to perform CA duties in all bases and, if needed, appropriate training.
Appropriate positions must be estabUshed for the director of commercial activity
(DCA). Contracting officers also must be assigned to the management staff Functional
managers should be trained to do required jobs such as writing performance work
statements, auditing, inspecting, reporting, etc.
a. Director of Commercial Activity (DCA)
Each installation which carries out the CA program needs a program
director. In the U.S., the DCA is positioned under the authority of the supporting
command. The DCA has the entire responsibility for the CA affairs, and is mainly
filled by civilian (not miUtary) personnel. In the U.S.'s 7th Infantr>' Division, the DCA
reports to the Directorate of Resource Management who is under the control of the
Garrison Commander.
The ROK Army can designate the DCA to the division level of the
installation. A ROK Army division normally has a resource management staff officer
who has 4 sections; general management, finance, accounting, and ADPS. The DCA
should be positioned within the resource management staff to do CA inventor^' and
estabhsh a special committee which organizes, and supports the management team.
Also they will support functional managers to write accurate Performance Work
Statements and specifications.
See Appendix D : Cost Comparison Format (U.S.)
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b. Contracting Officers.
Contracting involves a legal agreement between two parties: buyer and
seller. The term contracting officer means the person executing this contract on behalf
of the Government and other officer or civilian employees who are properly-designated
contracting otTicers. The term includes, except as otherwise provided in the contract,
the authorized representative of a contracting officer acting within the limits of his
authority. [Ref 34: p. 88]
As defined in the above statement, the contracting officer's task is very
important and delicate. Therefore, professional contracting officers will be needed to
implement the CA program. The ROK Army has contracting officers, but it is a part
of the career rotation o^ finance ofllcers. The need for professional contracting officers
will be even greater than now. Contracting officer representatives (COR) are also very
important to the contractor operation. Normally, some members of the personnel or
logistics stafl' are responsible for ensuring that the contractor accomplishes the tasks
for which he is being paid. The COR's influence and power rests upon how well the
PWS has laid out requirements, standards and the surveillance plan. A training
program for CORs should be considered as well as one for contracting officers.
4. Decentralizing the Program Execution Autiiority
After a predetermined period stated in the tentative plan, the CA program
could be implemented in all organizations. The lowest level which can execute a CA
program could be established as the division level. During the predetermined period,
each division must secure and train the needed personnel. The shortest way to do this
is through reinforcement of existing management staffs. The cost savings from the CA
program should be considered as one of the important criteria in troop evaluation as
well as officer's performance evaluation. This will motivate all commanders and related
staffs to do their best in budget savings.
E. RELATED ISSUES
1. Draft System
Since the foundation of its Armed Forces, the ROK has used the draft system
for soldiers, while officers and non-commissioned officers are professional personnel.
The Government only pays some spending money to enlisted personnel. So in the
ROK DoD budget, the salar}' of the enlisted men is ver>' small. In cost comparisons,
the in-house cost estimation must include the enlisted men's salary, but it is difficult to
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use existing salar>' levels directly. Considering the equity efTects of the CA program,
the opportunity cost concept should be applied to calculate the labor costs of enlisted
men.
2. Fringe Benefits
Fringe benefits are an important factor in calculating labor costs. The ROK
Military provides many kinds of extra benefits beyond salary. Pension programs, tax-
exempt goods purchasing, transportation discounts, medical insurance, discounted
access to recreation facilities, housing aid, and education expenditure subsidies are
typical benefits. It is very dilTicult to measure all these benefits in monetary terms and
it is difficult to say that every individual receives the same amount of fringe benefits.
Fringe benefits can be expressed as a certain proportion of labor costs, which
will vary according to the individual's rank, number of dependents, and salar\' steps.
So, if the CA program will be implemented, application of fringe benefits in cost
estimation will be a major political level issue. In other words, the decision-maker will
be responsible for determining the appropriate allocation of fringe benefits to direct
labor costs.
3. Mobilization Law
ROK mobilization law provides the legal authority to mobilize civilian
industries or private property and estates in war time. Every registered corporation has
an emergency planning director included in its top functional staff. These positions are
filled with retired military officers. The main purpose of this system is to prepare
mobilization readiness in peacetime and to execute this plan during nationwide
exercises or in case of war. [Ref 31: Provision 1-4-1, 1-4-2]
An appropriate amendment of this law is necessary to ensure the continuous
combat support by the contractors in war time. In the future, the aspects of conflict in
the Korean peninsula will be characterized by total war. There would not be any front
line or rear area. The entire population would defend their own company or homeland.
With this view point, the appropriate amendment of mobilization law will be necessary
in executing the CA program.
4. Contract Management and Administration
a. Government Property
Government property provided to contractors is often important in the
performance of a government contract. Such property may be provided for use in
government contract performance, because of the government's need for
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standardization, economy, stabilization of sources, broadening the industrial base, and
other factors that support the national interest. [Ref 34: pp. 129-133] When the
Government furnishes the property directly from its stores, it is called Government
Furnished Property (GFP) and when contractors purchase property to perform
government contract, it is called Contractor Acquired Property. These two categories
are covered under the general heading of government property.
In execution of the CA program, government property can be used for any
of the following reasons: ensuring proper security, standardization, or increasing
competition through allowing small businesses to compete using limited investment.
For depot level maintenance, the ROK Army can furnish the facilities and equipment
to contractors to avoid a performance vacuum during the transition time. GFP may
be especially useful in increasing competition because the Korean industrial base may
not provide sufficient competitors in some sectors.
b. Contract Types
Generally, government contracts are categorized into two types: fixed-price
and the cost reimbursement. The fixed-price contract usually stipulates a firm price,
however, under some circumstances, it may leave the final price open for later
adjustment. Under a fixed price contract the contractor guarantees the performance of
the contract. On the other hand, the cost-reimbursement contract is selected when the
cost of work cannot be adequately detailed for the contractor to guarantee
performance; therefore, the contractor can only promise his best efforts.
Depot level maintenance requires exact performance or guarantees instead
of contractors' best efforts. To determine whether to contract-out or not, government
agencies need exact cost estimation before performance. A fixed-price type contract is
appropriate for maintenance contracts. Maintenance work itself is not the same as a
production process of one product. Every item's maintenance costs vary according to
the equipment's condition. From this view point, the contractor would not be willing
to take a firm fixed-price arrangement. But as depot level maintenance is not minor
repairs, but usually means the overhauling, rebuilding, or modification of an
equipment, the variation in cost between several items should be ver>' small. This
means that a firm fixed-price contract is possible for depot maintenance. For the
purpose of encouraging the contractors, fixed price incentive contracts which are
designed to improve the contractor's performance in the area of costs, quality, and the
delivery schedule could be used. The most popular version of this type contract is a
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fixed-price incentive fee contract. Given the small risk to contractors in a depot
maintenance contract, a fixed-price incentive fee contract is reasonable.
F. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
The overall maintenance concept plays a vital role in assuring that military' forces
are equiped with weapon systems that are capable of performing in accordance with
design and mission. By implementing the CA program, maintaining a private industrial
capacity fully qualified in the repair of militar}' weapon systems and equipment
enhances the overall maintenance capacity of the ROK mihtar\', and provides an
extremely important base from which to expand during periods of conflict.
The cost comparison is the most important part of the CA program. But the
cost comparison could be subjective rather than objective, because an accurate cost
estimation is not possible. The cost savings, in the U.S.. advocated by the proponents
of contracting-out, have been substantiated as reasonable estimates by both GAO and
0MB. However, these estimates can't tell the whole storv' and do not account for all
costs related to that project. For instance, calculation of fringe benefits and conversion
costs are ver>' subject to political interpretation.
Generally, in the U.S., the elTect of the CA programs' implementation is
estimated positively. Korea has almost same economic structure as the U.S. and can
expect additional effects such as improving combat power under the strength ceiling
system, improving the relationship between civilian and miUtary organizations, and
contribution of militan-' spending to national economic growth.
ROK Army maintenance depots have a lot o[ problems concerning efficiency,
combat supportability, and capacity. By contracting-out or competition between in-
house and private industry', these problems could be eliminated or reduced. The
significant contributions of this program are to enhance the operational rate of the
defense industrv' and then to make the national industrv' healthier.
The military commanders must realize that contract work-forces play an
important part of the total force structure, because civilians can also fight against
North Korea with the outbreak of a war. Thus they must realize that they can enhance
the combat power base through contracting-out.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the U.S., for more than three decades the Federal Government has been
involved in an effort to more efficiently meet its needs for commercial goods and
services. The CA program falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive Branch
of the Federal Government. Over the years, the policy, espoused in OMB Circular
A-76 to reduce the cost of Federally operated CAs has been evolving. Originally a
program to contract-out all Government-oriented commercial functions, the current
initiative promotes the achievement of increased productivity both through cost
competitions with the private sector and in-house efficiency reviews. [Ref 1: pp. 71-75]
In some states in the U.S., even the operation of jails are performed by private firms,
as the Government searches for better efficiency and productivity.
It is very difficult to calculate the exact savings from this policy, but the U.S.
OMB estimates that the average savings has been between 25? b to 30? o when the
least-cost operation, in-house or contractor, was selected.
U.S. DoD has more difficulty in performing this policy than any other branch of
the Federal Government, since DoD has more to consider to implement this poUcy. In
particular, the criteria of CA is more obscure in the DoD field. However, DoD
agencies reported S501 million in savings from studies completed since 1979. [Ref 1]
On the other hand, the ROK military has concentrated heavily on an armed race
with North Korea. With the development of defense industries in the late 1970s, Korea
can afford to think of efficiency in military spending. As a result. Present Chun ordered
to seek more efficient ways to reduce operating expenditures and raise capital
investments.
The newly started Defense Resource Management System focuses on this point.
By giving every soldier ownerships and incentive, productivity and efficiency can be
promoted. Fortunately this new Defense Resource Management System forces the use
of an accounting system in the military. Also, the structural organization was changed
to meet the needs of management. One more merit is the introduction of computer
based information systems. At the divisional level, many computer hardware systems
was installed in late 1985, and the needed personnel were trained and assigned to these
areas. All these developments can facilitate the implemention of the CA program in the
Korean military organization.
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Currently, it is not possible to implement the CA program throughout the entire
military' organization. Korea needs more qualified personnel and time to adjust
mentally to these new circumstances. Korea must review the U.S.'s management
history first and then implement this policy. In the first stages, it is more important
that the military and government employees recognize the existance of their
competitors.
This CA program would help integrate the military' and civilian sectors. The
Korean military' organization is currently isolated completely fi-om the rest of society.
Isolation of the military organization develops social, or even political problems. This
isolation has efiected the economic sector. For example, military personnel have had
many difiiculties finding jobs after retirement.
In this paper, the authors selected the depot maintenance function as an example
for discussion. As discussed in a previous chapter, the ROK military maintenance
system has a lot of difficulties. Depot maintenance in particular also has problems in
several fields. Thus, many advantages could be anticipated from implementing the CA
program in the depot maintenance function.
In addition to raising efficiency in the military sector, contracting-out of the
depot maintenance function can generate more additional benefits. For example,
reducing operational budget spending (and thereby allow increasing capital
investment), enhancing the military readiness base in peace time, raising the
operational rate of the defense industry, contributing to national economic growth, and
promoting the relationship between the military and civilian sectors. Besides depot
maintenance, the ROK military can consider several other functions such as food
services on bases as the first stage of implementation. It depends highly on whether it
is a CA or not, but this CA criteria is also very subjective. By considering the overall
environment, decision makers could make the decision whether it is a CA or not.
From this view point, the depot maintenance function could be a good example of that
argument.
The most important consideration (efTect) that could be obtained from CA
program implementation is to promote the total combat power. The operating
expenditures will be reduced from the CA program within the given budget and the
number of active soldiers in combat units will be increased under the strength ceiling
circumstance. Usually combat power is regarded as the number of soldiers, equipment
and weapon systems in a combat area. But under the CA program, active soldiers
could be assigned to combat units and civilians could be placed in the jobs left by the
soldiers. The ROK can secure and maintain enough personnel power compared to
North Korea.
The authors suggest the following sequential steps to implement a CA program
in the ROK military:
1) Preparing appropriate law(s) to provide legal authority in execution.
2) Preparing and issuing directives, instructions, and regulations in DoD.
3) Establishing tentative execution plans.
4) Utilizing task, forces (centralized management) at the begining stage.
5) Securing and training needed personnel
6) Decentralizing the execution of the CA program to divisional level.
In cost estimation and comparison, the differential cost concept is advisable at the
begining stage. According to the execution results, cost comparison techniques could
be developed to best fit the Korean situation.
Finally, decision makers have to have an appreciative eye of national dimensions.
Narrow-minded thinking implies that military spending may be increased by the CA
program simply because a civilian's salary is higher than a soldier's. But the CA
program can generate a lot of external effects on both military organization and
civilian society, and these externalities can contribute much to the final goal of the
national policy: establishing an advanced welfare state.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN U.S.
AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICE
Photography (still, movie, aerial, etc.)
Photographic processing (developing, printing, enlarging, etc.)
Film and videotape production (script writing, direction, animation, editing
acting, etc.)
Microfilming and other microforms
Art and graphics services
Distribution of audiovisual materials
Reproduction and duplication of audiovisual products
Audiovisual facility management and operation
Maintenance of audiovisual equipment
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
ADP service (batch processing, time-sharing, facility management, etc.)
Programming and systems analysis, design, development, and simulation
Key punching
,
data entr\', transmission, and teleprocessing services
System engineering and installation
Equipment installation, operation, and maintenance
FOOD SERVICE
• Operation of cafeterias, mess halls, kitchens, bakeries, dairies, and commissaries
• Vending machines
• Ice and water
HEALTH SERVICE
Surgical, medical,dental, and psychiatric care
Hospitalization, outpatient, and nursing care
Physical examinations
Eve and hearing examinations and manufacturing and fitting glasses and
hearing aids






INDUSTRIAL SHOPS AND SERVICES
• Machine, carpentry, electrical, plumbing,painting, and other shops
• Industrial gas production and recharging
• Equipment and instrument fabrication, repair and calibration
• Plumbing, heating, electrical, and air conditioning services including repair
• Fire protection and janitorial services
• Refuse collection and processing
MAINTENANCE, OVERHAUL, REPAIR, AND TESTING
Aircraft and aircraft components




Electronic equipment and systems
Weapons and weapon systems
Medical and dental equipment





• Advertising and public relations services
• Financial and payroll services
• Debt collection
MANUFACTURING, FABRICATION,PROCESSING, TESTING, AND
PACKAGING
• Ordinance equipment
• Clothing and fabric products
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Liquid, gaseous, and chemical products
Lumber products
Communications and electronics equipment
Rubber and plastic products
Optical and related products
Sheet metal and foundry products
Machined products
Construction materials
Test and instrumentation equipment
OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
Librar\' operations
Stenographic recording and transcribing
Word processing, data entry, typing services
Mail/messenger
Translation
Management information system, products and distribution






Laundry and dry cleaning
Mapping and charting
Architect and engineering services
Geological surveys
Cataloging
Training (academic, technical, vocational, and specialized)
Operation of utility systems (power, gas, warter, stream, and sewage)
Laborator>' testing services
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
• Facility management and operation
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• Printing and binding (where the asencv or department is exempted from the
provisions of Title 4^ of the U.S. Code)
'
• Reproduction, copying, and duplication
• Blueprinting
REAL PROPERTY
• Design, engineering, construction, modification, repair, and maintenance of
buildines and structures;buildine mechanical and electrical equipment and
systems;elevators;escalators;moviiig walks
• Construction, alteration, repair, and maintenance of roads and other surfaced
areas
• Landscaping, drainage, mowing and care of grounds
• Dredging of waterways
SECURITY
• Guard and protective services
• Svstems engineering, installation, and maintenance of security systems and
iridividual pnvacy systems
• Forensic laboratories





Defense, education, energy studies
Legal/litigation studies
Management studies
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, INSTALLATION, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE,
AND TESTING
Communications systems (voice, message, data, radio, wire, microwave, and
satellite
Missile ranges
Satellite tracking and data acquisition
Radar detection and tracking




• Bulk storage facilities
TRANSPORTATION
Operation of motor pools
Bus service
Vehicle operation and maintenance




FLOW CHARTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A-76






















































































AN EXAMPLE OF CURRENT ROK ARMY DEPOT JOB ORDER "
COSTING
1. ORGANIZATION CHART OF VEHICLE MAINTENANCE GROUP
The Vehicle maintenance group is one subset in ROK Army Xth maintenance
depot. The Group has 5 departments: Light Vehicle, Engine, Transmission, Service,
and Heavy Vehicle Department. Each department operates its own headquarters and
supply section, and 3 to 8 functional sections.
The Light Vehicle and Heavy Vehicle Departments produce finished products,
and ship the products to the supply depot. The Engine and Transmission Departments
repair the failed items and produce the parts or semi-finished goods of which some are
shiped to the supply depot while others are sent to the Assembly Section of the Light
Vehicle Division. The Service Department supports all the other departments in the
vehicle maintenance group. The organizational chart of Vehicle Group is shown
Figure CT.
2. HYPOTHETICAL COST DATA DURING NOVEMBER, 1985
The vehicle maintenance division of a ROK Army functional maintenance depot
provided following hypothetical data^^ for November, 1985. Job 101 (K-300 5/4 ton :
10 ) started in November, 1986, and finished during November. Job 102 (K-lOO 1/4 ton
Jeep : 5) started in November, but not yet finished,
a. Direct Materials
#101 : S 3,200, #102 : S 1,600, # 101-1 : S 2,800.
# 102-1 : S 1,400, # 101-2 : S 1,600, # 102-2 : S 1,200
17The hvpothetical data are derived from the ROK Army Managerial Accounting
System [Ref lOl. The authors revised the values of costs on the oasis of realistic
observation while the allocation rates are adopted from the reference. The monthly



































































































Parts Parts Supports Finished
Products
Suppl] T Depot
Figure Cl The Organizational Chart of Vehicle Division.
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b. Direct Labor Hours of Departments (Factories)
The rate of direct labor per hour is S 1.40.
/. Direct Labor Hours of Light Vehicle Department

















750 500 370 2.920
* Note : The a3 means the disassemble section of the lisht vehicle
department. See Table C.l.
2. Direct Labor Hours of Engine Department





















Total 470 600 380 540 700 300 450 600 4,040
3. Direct Labor Hours of Transmission Department













Total 500 300 400 270 1,470
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4. Direct Labor Hours of Service Department
Jobs d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 Total
101 50 70 80 ^ 60 70 330
102 40 50 50 30 20 190
101-1 60 70 60 30 40 260
102-1 50 50 40 40 30 210
101-2 40 20 30 10 10 110
102-2 30 30 10 10 20 100
Total 270 290 270 180 190 1,200
5. Direct Labor Hours for Each Job Order

















Total 2,430 1,010 3,310 1,200 1,010 670
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c. Indirect Maintenance Costs
/. Light Vehicle Department










































































































5. Home Office Expense
The home ofTice expenses of the maintenance depot HQ and stafT oHlces
are S 10,000.
6. Other Costs
Supported service cost (SS) : S 400
Electric and water fares (EW) : S 800
Depreciation Expense (DEP) : S 1.200
7. Department HO and Supply Section Cost Allocation Base
(1) Allocation Rales for Department Headquarters Sections' Costs. The
allocation rates of HQ section costs to production sections could be determined on the
basis of square feet of buildings or the number of employees of each production
sections within each department. The rates, as shown below, could be described in the
standard operating procedures (SOP) of the departments.
Light Vehicle a 3 a4 a5 a6 a7 Total
Allocation Rate 20% 30% 25% 15'Vo 10% 100%
Engine b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 blO Total
Rate 15% 10% 15% 10% 15% 20% 10% 5% 100%
Transmission c3 c4 c5 c6 Total
Allocation Rate 20^/o 20% 35% 25% 100%
Service d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 Total
Allocation Rate 20% 10% 15% 25'% 30% 100%
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(2) Allocation Rates for Supply Sections' Costs.
The allocation rates of supply sections could be also determined on the basis of the
number of employees or machine hours of production section, and described in
department SOP.
Light Vehicle a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 Total
Rate 20% 10% 15% 25% 30'^^'o 100%
Engine b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 bS b9 blO Total
Rate 5% 10'' 20°'o 15% 10% 15% 10% 15% 100°'o
Transmission c3 c4 c5 c6 Total
Allocation Rate 25% 35% 20*^/0 20°^> 100''
Service d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 Total
Allocation Rate 30% 25% 15% 10% 20% 100%
8. Cost of Production Sections
The costs of production sections such as Drilling or Rebuilt Sections will be
allocated to each job order on the basis of direct labor hours.
9. Allocation Rate for Home Office Expense and Other Cost
The home office expense and other cost will be allocated on the basis of the
total amounts of both direct material and direct labor costs.
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3. COST ALLOCATIONS TO EACH DEPARTMENT
a. Department Headquarters and Supply Sections Cost Allocation
/. Light Vehicle Department


































Total 2,960 552 552 712 672 472 - -
° Section Indirect Cost = Section Indirect Materials + Section Indirect Labor
= 200 + 160 = S 360
^ Department Overhead x Allocation Rate = 800 x 10% = S 80
^ HQ Section Costs x Allocation Rate = 280 x 20% = S 56
^ Supply Section Costs x Allocation Rate = 280 x 20% = S 56
2. Engine Department














































TOT 3,040 377 447 290 421 491 510 277 227
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3. Transmission Department






























Total 1,780 307 407 468 598 - -
4. Service Department


































Total 1,880 398 387 305 338 452 - -
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b. Headquarters and Supply Sections' Cost Allocation to Job Orders
Section Total 101 102 101-1 102-1 101-2 102-2
a3 552^* 394 158
a4 552 368 184 . . . .
aD 712 475 237 . . . .
a6 672 538 134 . . _ .
a7 472 382 89 - - - -
b3 377 321 56
b4 447 . - 372 75 - .
b5 290 . _ 229 61 _ .
b6 421 . _ 356 70 . .
b7 491 . _ 351 140 . .
b8 510 . _ 340 170 . .
b9 277 _ _ 185 92 _ _
blO 227 - - 151 76 - -
c3 307 184 123
c4 407 . . _ - 271 136
CO 468 . _ _ . 293 175
c6 598 - - - - 332 266
d3 398 74 59 88 74 59 44
d4 387 93 67 93 67 26 40
d5 305 90 56 68 45 34 11
d6 338 113 56 56 75 19 19
d7 452 167 48 95 71 24 48
Total 9,660 2,694 1,088 2,701 1,072 1,242 863
S 552 X {500 hrs / 700 hrs) = S 394

















Total 11,800 13,482 25,282 100
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d. Home Office and Other Cost Allocation to Related Jobs
101 102 101-1 102-1 101-2 102-2 Total

























ToT 624 288 696 288 288 216 2,400
Total 3.224 1.488 3,596 1,488 1,488 1,116 12.400
Home OfTice Expense = 10,000 x 26% = S 2,600
Supported Services = 400 x 26% =- S 104
Electrics and Water Fee = 800 x 26% = S 208
Depreciation Expense = 1200x26% = 5 312
e. Job Order Costs Allocation Summary
Total 101 102 101-1 102-1 101-2 102-2
D-Mat 11,800 3,200, 1,600 2.800 1,400
D-Lab 13.482 3,402" 1,414 4,634 1,680
Ind 9,660 2,694 1,089 2,701 1,020
HO 10,000 2,600 1,200 2.900 1,200






Total 47,342 12,520 5,590 13,731 5.640 5,744 4.116
Parts - 19,475 - (13,731) - (5,744) -
FG 31,995 31,995 - - - - -
WIP 15,347 - 5,591 - 5,640 - 4,116
^ Direct Labor Cost = 2430 hrs x S 1.40;hr = S 2,694
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f. Cost of Maintenance During November
Cost of Maintenance
Direct Cost
Direct Materials $ 11,800
Direct Labor 13,482 $ 25,282
Indirect Cost
Manufacturing Overhead 9,660
Home Office (Depot) 19,660 19,660
Other Costs
Supported Services 400
Electrics and Water 800
Depreciation 1,200 2,400
47,342
Ending Work in process 15,347
Cost of Finished Goods Maintained
( K-300 5/4 ton :10) 31,995
4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL MAINTENANCE COST
As shown Table 7 monthly cost data could be obtained from the vehicle group of
the ROK Army Maintenance depot on the basis of the same job order costing method.
. Regression analysis as shown in Table 8 provides the fixed cost (S 22.021) and
variable cost (S974;unit) estimated to rebuild the K-300. This fixed and variable cost
could be used to estimate the in-house cost on the basis of estimated work-load.
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TABLE 7
MONTHLY COST DATA DURING 1985
Month Number of Vehicle Maintenance
1985 Maintenanced Cost












Total 133 $ 393758
Note : See 3. f. in previous page for this value.
Liated observations forOther values are simu
illustration of techrlique.
TABLE 8
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY COST DATA
The regression equation is
Cost = 22021 + 974 Vehicles






Vehicle 973.77 51.57 18.88
s = 458.1 R-sg = 97.3% R-sq(adj) = 97.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS
Regression 1 74831280 74831280




COST COMPARISON FORMAT (U.S.)
IN-House vs. Contract Performance
Performance Periods
In-house Performance Costs 1st 2nd 3rd Add'l Total Reference
1. Personnel Cost













10. One-time Conversion Costs
11. Gain or Loss on Disposal/
Transfer of Assets
12. Federal Income Tax
• (Deduct) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
13. Total Contract Costs
Decision
1^. Conversion Differential
15. Total (Line 13 81A)
16. Cost Comparison (LinelS minus Line 6)
Do the cost comparison calculatiort only for the total column.
Positive result on Line 16 supports Decision to accomplish
function in-house
17. Cost Comparison Decision (check block) / / Accomplish In-house
/ / Accomplish by Contract
Name/Title/Organization Signature Date
In-house Estimate Prepared Byt
In-house Estimate Reviewed Byi
Cost Comparison Accomplished By:
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